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The Expansion of the First Amendment in Judicial
Elections: Another Cause for Reform
Mary Eileen Weicher*
Mentored by Jona Goldschmidt*
By some [states'] constitutions the members of the [judiciary] are
elected, and they are even subjected to frequent re-elections. I venture
to predict that these innovations will sooner or later be attended with
fatal consequences; and that it will be found out at some future period,
that the attack which is made upon the judicial power has affected the
democratic republic itself.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In order to encourage judicial integrity and foster public respect for
the judiciary, all fifty states and the District of Columbia impose ethical
and practical restrictions on the political speech and activity of judges
and judicial candidates. 2 Proponents of these restrictions argue that as a
* J.D., Loyola University Chicago School of Law, expected May 2008. I would like to thank Dr.
Jona Goldschmidt for his helpful assistance in all aspects of this article, as well as my family and
friends for their support.
**Dr. Jona Goldschmidt is an associate professor in Loyola University Chicago's Department of
Criminal Justice. Formerly, he was a senior analyst with the Arizona Supreme Court
Administrative Office of the Courts, and assistant executive director of the American Judicature
Society. He also taught at Arizona State University and Northern Arizona University. A member
of the Illinois and California bars, he received his J.D. (1975) from DePaul University College of
Law, and his Ph.D. (1990) in the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Justice Studies from
Arizona State University. His areas of research and publication include pro se litigation,
unauthorized practice of law, alternative dispute resolution, sociology of professions, judicial
selection, judicial ethics, and criminal justice ethics. His book, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF
PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS, coauthored with Barry Mahoney, Harvey Solomon, and Joan Green, resulted in the 1998 Howell
Heflin Award from the State Justice Institute, which annually recognizes "an innovative SJIsupported project that has a high likelihood of significantly improving the quality of justice in
state courts across the nation." His most recent Article entitled Judicial Assistance to SelfRepresented Parties:Lessons from the CanadianExperience, is forthcoming in the JOURNAL OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURT.

1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 305 (Henry Reeve trans., 1845).
2. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL
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highly visible symbol of government, judicial impropriety damages the
public's trust and confidence in our legal system, whether it occurs via
political activity or personal misconduct. 3 Concern for the appearance
of judicial impartiality, they argue, justifies otherwise impermissible
limits on judges' personal and political activities. 4 Widely used
mechanisms for ensuring judicial independence and impartiality include
limiting judges' political speech and association, limiting judicial
from speaking publicly
campaign contributions, and preventing judges
5
about issues that may come before the bench.
Constitutional scrutiny of restrictions on judicial conduct has
narrowed the scope of the states' powers to pursue this interest. 6 In
1993, the Seventh Circuit held that a provision in the Illinois Code of
Judicial Conduct ("Illinois Code") prohibiting a judge or candidate from
'announcing" his or her views on disputed legal or political issues
violated the First Amendment.7 More recently, in 2002, the United
States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion regarding a8 virtually
identical provision in the Minnesota Judicial Code of Conduct.
To the extent that these decisions resolved constitutional issues
surrounding judges' free speech rights, they complicated the task of
addressing the states' interests in judicial independence and
impartiality. 9 Some commentators insist that judicial ethical standards
are necessary to avert the threat of inappropriate influences on judicial
judgment posed by outside pressures. 10 The importance of ethical
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 4 (1990) (noting that all but Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin
adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct). Since that time, Rhode Island and Wisconsin have
adopted the 1990 version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules, Art. VI,
Rule 1 (2007); Wis. Ct. Rules & Proc., Sup. Ct. Rules ch. 60.
3. Paul J. De Muniz, Eroding the Public's Confidence in Judicial Impartiality: First
Amendment Federal Jurisprudence and Special Interest Financing of Judicial Campaigns, 67
ALB. L. REV. 763, 763 (2004).
4. See Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges' PoliticalActivity After White, 68 ALB. L. REV.

651, 665-70 (2005) (arguing that ethics canons restricting judicial speech serve a compelling
state interest that deserve deference).
5. See infra Part I.B.I and Il.B.2 (discussing the Model Code, a form of which is adopted in
almost every state).

6. See De Muniz, supra note 3, at 764 (forecasting the "constitutional demise" of states'
regulations on judicial speech and activity).
7. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
8. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
9. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 651 (arguing that state regulatory systems designed to promote
these interests have been thrown into disarray).
10. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American Judicial
Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1028 (2002); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign
Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996)
(arguing that ethical norms are essential to an independent judiciary).
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standards notwithstanding, the states' interests in preserving the reality

and perception of judicial impartiality
must be balanced against the
11
weight of the First Amendment.

There are heightened concerns about judicial impartiality and bias
where judges campaign in contested elections to win a seat on the
bench. 12 States with an elected judiciary must somehow reconcile two
competing interests. 13 On the one hand, the choice to elect the judiciary
ostensibly represents a decision to make judges accountable to the
people through popular vote. 14 On the other hand, many scholars and
observers agree that judges should not be responsive to a constituency;
rather, due process requires that judges adhere to the rule of law,
regardless of public opinion. 15 Restrictions on the political speech and
activity of judges, during campaigns and while on the bench, intend to
strike a balance between these principles, adhering to elective
democratic ideals, but insulating the judiciary from the corrupting
16
effects of politics.

Some commentators argue that it is impossible to strike this delicate
balance. 17
They believe that no codified ethical standards can
effectively insulate the judiciary from the political process; the very
necessity of doing so, they argue, proves that judges do not belong in
the political arena. 18 Even assuming that ethical restraints can be
effective, recent decisional law diluting their substance will ultimately

11. See James L. Swanson, Judicial Elections and the First Amendment: Freeing Political
Speech, 2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 85, 110 (2001-2002) (characterizing the White decision as a
"victory for the First Amendment").
12. See infra Part n.A.3 (discussing the fear that election campaigns make judges beholden to
campaign contributors or voters' interests); see also Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and
Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659, 665 (2002) (discussing the purposes of
judicial elections and the necessity of appropriate regulations to ensure that judicial elections are
conducted differently than other elections).
13. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (Illinois Supreme Court Justice Heiple's
statement of these interests).
14. See infra Part II.A.2 (presenting arguments in favor of judicial elections, including judicial
accountability).
15. See Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence By Use of Judicial
PerformanceEvaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1061 (2002) (arguing that judges should
be accountable only to the rule of law); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and
Liberty in JudicialEthics, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1092 (1996) (arguing that "the rules of
judicial conduct are rooted in constitutional due process").
16. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2, and II.B.4 (analyzing the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provisions restricting judicial speech and political
activity).
17. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the arguments of judicial election opponents).
18. See generally Part l.A. 1 (discussing the reasons why states instituted judicial elections in
the first place, including the desire to insulate judges from the power of the other branches).
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render such restraints useless. 19 As a result, some commentators
conclude that popular, political elections are the least preferable means
20
of judicial selection.
The tension between the political aspects of judicial selection, the
demands of the First Amendment, and the ideals of judicial integrity,
independence, and impartiality is apparent in Illinois, which selects its
judiciary in partisan elections. 21 Securing the public's trust and
confidence is a serious challenge facing the Illinois judiciary today. 22 A
2006 survey by the Chicago Bar Association reported that only five
percent of voters are "very satisfied" with the current judicial selection
23
system in Illinois, and forty-three percent are "somewhat satisfied.
In a national survey commissioned by the United States Chamber of
Commerce, Illinois' legal system ranked forty-fifth out of fifty states in
2005 on the issue of "judges' impartiality." 24 Illinois fared slightly
better on the issue of "judges' competence," ranking forty-third. 2 5 In
the same survey, Cook County was rated "third worst" in the country
among cities or counties with "the least fair and reasonable litigation
environments." 26 These findings echo the themes of a 1999 national
survey of public perception of the courts, which found widespread
concerns about a lack of accountability on the part of the judicial
branch, poor methods of judicial selection and performance evaluation,
and political intrusion. 27 The ongoing debate regarding the best means
28
of judicial selection focuses precisely on these concerns.

19. See Max Minzner, Gagged But Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing
Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REV. 209, 215-27 (1999) (discussing the ways judges
and candidates navigate the political campaign process, notwithstanding ethical rules).
20. See infra Part Il.A.3 (setting forth the main criticisms of judicial elections).
21. See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 cmt. (West 2006) (Heiple, J. concurring,
Aug. 6, 1993 amendment) (noting that the Illinois Code attempts to accommodate these

competing interests).
22. See infra Part III.B (discussing the public perception of the Illinois judiciary).
23. CHI.
BAR
ASS'N,
JUDICIAL
VOTERS
SURVEY
(2006),
available
at
http://www.chicagobar.org/public/judicial/ survey.asp. [hereinafter CHI. BAR ASS'N SURVEY].
24. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
2006 STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2006), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform. com/harris/pdf/2006_FULLReportFINAL.pdf. [hereinafter
STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY].
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 5.
27. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY 1-5 (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.pdf. [hereinafter 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY].
28. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of PopularJudicialElections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 31 (1986) ("[I]t is fairly certain that no single
subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over the past
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This Comment argues that the Illinois Code, which places restrictions
on the speech and activity of judges and candidates, is an ineffective
29
means of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Illinois Code's speech restrictions do not prevent candidates from
making express or implied commitments to rule a certain way by
announcing their views on issues that are likely to come before them on
the bench, thereby implicating due process concerns. 30 Such campaign
promises, exorbitant monetary contributions that make the campaigns
possible, and pervasive control of political parties over the selection of
31
judicial candidates breed public cynicism and distrust of the courts.
Proposed reforms of the election process, such as revision of the ethical
canons on judicial conduct, disqualification rules, or public financing of
32
judicial elections, are inadequate to address these concerns.
Therefore, this Comment concludes that Illinois should renew efforts33to
reform the judicial selection process by eliminating judicial elections.
To provide a background for the current debate about judicial
elections, Part II of this Comment reviews the history of judicial
selection in Illinois and the modem development of ethical canons
restricting judicial speech and activity. 3 4 To assess whether the Illinois
Code achieves its objective, Part Ell discusses the public's perception of
the Illinois judiciary by recounting the controversy surrounding the
2004 Illinois Supreme Court race and reviewing voter surveys and
various media sources. 35 Part IV argues that, in light of the demands of
the First Amendment and the changing nature of judicial campaigns, the
Illinois Code's restrictions do not safeguard the reality and perception
of judicial independence and impartiality. 3 6 Part IV also discusses
proposed reforms of judicial elections that inadequately address these
fifty years as the subject of judicial selection.").
29. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that current First Amendment jurisprudence, holding many
restrictions on judicial speech and activity unconstitutional, renders those restrictions incapable of
placing meaningful limits on judicial conduct).
30. See Minzner, supra note 19, at 215-27 (discussing the myriad ways judicial candidates
signal their views to voters notwithstanding the ethical canons).
31. See infra Part E.B (citing various studies and reports finding that public trust and
confidence in the courts in Illinois is diminishing).
32. See infra Part IV.B (rejecting proposals for reforming judicial elections).
33. See infra Part V (proposing that Illinois eliminate judicial elections in favor of another
judicial selection method).
34. See infra Part H (recounting the history of judicial selection and restrictions on judicial
activity in Illinois).
35. See infra Parts H.A and II.B (discussing evidence of the public's perception of the
Illinois judiciary).
36. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that ethical restrictions on judicial conduct cannot guarantee
judicial independence and impartiality).
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concerns. 37 Part V concludes that, in light of the fact that ethical
restrictions cannot remedy problems presented by the elective process
and considering the inadequacy of more intermediate reforms, Illinois
should reform the judicial selection process entirely by eliminating
38
judicial elections.
II. BACKGROUND

Although Illinois has had an elected judiciary since before it became
a state, the structure of the judiciary has changed significantly over
39
time, adapting to increases in population and constitutional revision.
This Part begins by presenting the history of the judiciary and judicial
selection in Illinois and discussing the arguments supporting and
opposing judicial elections. 40 Like most states, Illinois imposed no
formal ethical restrictions on judges or judicial candidates until the last
This Part also describes the development of these
century. 4 1
restrictions, beginning with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("the
Model Code") and its adoption as the Illinois Code. 4 2 Next, this Part
examines recent decisional law striking down some of the Code's
restrictions on judicial speech and activity. 43 Finally, this Part examines
the Proposed Revisions to the Model Code drafted in response to these
decisions.44
A. Methods of Judicial Selection
With the exception of a brief period early in Illinois' history when the
legislature possessed the power to appoint judges, Illinois has always
However, population growth and political
elected its judges. 45
considerations, including revisions to the Illinois Constitution,
37. See infra Part IV.B (discussing proposed intermediate methods of reforming the judicial
election process).
38. See infra Part V (proposing that Illinois eliminate judicial elections).
39. See infra Part IHA.1 (relating the history of constitutional revision and related changes in
the judiciary).
40. See infa Part I.A (presenting the history of judicial selection in Illinois and arguments in
favor of and against judicial elections).
41. See infra Part Il.B. I (discussing the adoption of the Illinois Code in 1986).
42. See infra Parts 11.B.1 (describing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Illinois
Code of Judicial Conduct).
43. See infra Part 11.B.3 (reviewing the development of ethics canons on judicial speech and

activity).
44. See infra Part 11.B.4 (analyzing the content of the Proposed Revisions to the Model Code).
45. See DAVID F. ROLEWICK, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

(Admin. Office of the Ill. Court, rev. ed. 1971) (narrating a history of judicial selection in
Illinois). From 1818 until 1848, judges were appointed. Id. at 8-10. The Illinois Constitution of
1848 first formally created an elected judiciary. Id. at 11.
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significantly affected the judiciary's structure. 4 6 In order to present a

complete picture of the Illinois judiciary, this Section presents the
history of judicial selection in Illinois, including modem efforts to
reform the judicial selection process. 4 7 It then presents arguments
49
supporting 4 8 and criticizing judicial elections.
1. A Brief History of the Judiciary and

Judicial Selection in Illinois
The first elected judiciary in Illinois came into existence when
George Rogers Clark claimed Illinois County on behalf of the Republic
of Virginia in 1778.50 Under Clark's governance, seven men were
elected as judges in each of three settlements, with a majority of four
necessary for a decision. 51 A year later, in 1779, John Todd was
appointed as County Lieutenant and reorganized the court system into
three districts with six elected judges each. 5 2 This system existed until
Illinois was admitted as a state in 1818, although disagreements among

46. See infra Part II.A.1 (presenting the various changes in the Illinois judiciary brought about
by statute and constitutional revision).
47. See infra Part II.A.1 (presenting the history of judicial selection in Illinois).
48. See infra Part I.A.2 (setting forth the arguments in favor of judicial elections).
49. See infra Part lI.A.3 (setting forth the arguments criticizing judicial elections).
50. ELLIO'T ANTHONY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 29-33 (1891). "Illinois
was fortunate in the beginning by having for her founders a race of great men. Col. George
Rogers Clark, the conqueror of the Illinois country, takes rank next to Hannibal." Id. at 46.
However, Clark received a disappointing reward for winning the territory from the English and
French:
Alone and with the very slenderest means, he had conquered and held a vast and
beautiful region, which, but for him, would have formed part of a foreign and hostile
empire; he had clothed and paid his soldiers with the spoils of his enemies; he had
spent his own fortune as carelessly as he had risked his life, and the only reward that he
was destined for many years to receive, was the sword voted him by the Legislature.
Id. at 30. Tradition holds that when the Virginia commissioners offered him the ceremonial
sword, "an empty bauble for his services," he rejected it, saying "that he demanded from Virginia
his just rights and promised reward of his services, not an empty compliment." Id. Later, "It]he
inhabitants of Illinois paid to his shade the posthumous honor of naming a county after him, and
the city of Chicago an important street, over which uncounted thousands daily and hourly pass
and repass, who never knew of his existence, and never heard of his exploits." Id.
51. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 4. Clark himself acted as the court of appeal. Id. Although
the judicial system technically was in effect, because of the delicate situation in Illinois, Clark
found it necessary at times to resort to martial law. Id.
52. Id. During that period, the courts applied a revised version of French law (although
English common law was becoming influential). Id. Prior to Clark's victory, the European
inhabitants of Illinois were governed by the "Custom of Paris." Id. at 3. When France ceded the
Illinois territory to Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris in 1763, there was a brief attempt to
impose the English system. Id. The attempt was largely unsuccessful due to hostility between
the French inhabitants and English commanders. Id. Initially in 1778, Clark attempted to impose
the English court system, but was unsuccessful for this reason. Id. at 4.
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settlements, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Illinois, and the

General Assembly caused various minor changes in the judicial system
53
in place.
The Illinois Constitution of 1818 vested the General Assembly with
the power to appoint a Supreme Court of four judges, who rode circuit
as an appellate court.54 In the following three decades, it became clear
that the General Assembly's power to appoint and remove all judges
made the judiciary totally dependent on that body. 55 Namely, partisan
changes in the General Assembly caused repeated and disruptive
changes in the structure of the judiciary. 5 6 It became apparent that an
effective judiciary must be independent of the legislative branch.5 7
53. For example, there was disagreement about whether Supreme Court judges should
continue to "ride circuit as circuit judges." Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction in all cases "except in cases of
revenue, mandamus, habeas corpus, and impeachment." Id. Inferior courts were established by
the General Assembly. Id.
55. Id. at 10. See ANTHONY, supra note 50, at 44. In fact, the General Assembly had the
power to appoint all "officers of the State." Id. at 39. Precisely which were officers of the State
became the subject of debate; in a short period of time, the members of the General Assembly
agreed that the term encompassed a broad category of persons. Id. at 44. Considerable political
turmoil resulted from this appointment power. In the words of one historian, "Thus 'accoutered,'
the Constitution was adopted and 'they all plunged in.' By 'they' we mean the whole army of
hungry politicians, who were waiting the day when they could obtain access to the public crib and
fatten on its stores." Id.
56. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 10; See ANTHONY, supra note 50, at 45. The General
Assembly's appointment power also negatively affected the relationship of the other two
branches:
This constant changing and shifting of powers from one coordinate branch of the
government to another, which rendered it impossible for the people to foresee exactly
for what purpose either the governor or the Legislature were elected, was one of the
worst features of the government. It led to innumerable intrigues and corruptions, and
for a long time destroyed the harmony between the executive and legislative
departments.
ANTHONY, supra note 50, at 45.
57. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 10; ANTHONY, supra note 50, at 93-102. Moreover, the
legislature exercised the appointment power irresponsibly: three of the four judges first appointed
to the Supreme Court of Illinois under the Constitution of 1818 were extraordinarily underqualified. ANTHONY, supra note 50, at 93-94. The Chief Justice, John Phillips, "appears to have
been a lawyer," but came to the State through the army and was primarily involved in politics.
Id. at 93. Thomas C. Brown was a "large man, affable," generally unqualified to sit as a judge,
and was "laughed at and despised by many lawyers." Id. John Reynolds had studied law for a
few months, had no experience practicing, and "was absolutely without any of the qualifications
requisite for [a] judge of the highest court in the State." Id. Finally, William P. Foster, who had
been in the State about three months, was revealed to be a "consummate scoundrel and swindler."
Id. He was not a lawyer and had never even studied law. Id. Foster remained in Illinois for a
year, never acting as a judge but still drawing his salary. Id. at 94. See also SAMUEL K. GOVE &
THOMAS R. KJTSOS, REVISION SUCCESS: THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3
(1974) (including "an inadequate judiciary" as one of the failures of the Constitution of 1818);
Schotland, supra note 12, at 659-60 (judicial elections were chosen not to increase popular
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The Illinois Constitution of 1848 attempted to accomplish this by

providing for the popular election of all judges to a Supreme Court, nine
circuit courts, and various county courts. 58 In the following decades, a

surge in population led to the reorganization of the judiciary in the
Illinois Constitution of 1870. 59 The 1870 Constitution established a
Supreme Court of seven justices, elected from seven newly created
districts. 60 Judges in the Appellate Court, created by the General
Assembly in 1877, were appointed by the Supreme Court. 6 1 Seventeen
circuit courts, each with one elected judge, were created, county courts
were established, and probate courts were established in counties with a
minimum population size. 62 The Constitution of 1870 also allowed for
63
the continued service of police magistrates and justices of the peace.
Continuing population growth later resulted in legislation creating a
Juvenile Court, a Court of Claims, and the establishment of the
Municipal Court of Chicago in the early 1900s. 64
The General
Assembly's method of creating a court wherever there was a perceived
need for judicial resources generated a great deal of confusion; by 1962,
65
Cook County had 208 courts.

control, but to free the judiciary from domination by the other branches, and to increase the
quality of judges on the bench).
58. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 11.
See generally Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79, 89-99 (1998) (describing the adoption of judicial election in general in the nineteenth
century and subsequent developments in the judicial selection debate).
59. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 11. See Harry G. Fins, Analysis of Illinois JudicialArticle of
1961 and its Legislative and Judicial Implementation, 11 DEPAUL L. REv. 185, 188-91 (1962)
(describing the judicial structure created by the Constitution of 1870 and comparing it with later
reforms).
60. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 13.
61. Id. Four appellate courts were created in 1877, consisting of three judges appointed by the
Supreme Court or, in Cook County, by the Superior Court. Id. at 13-15.
62. Id. at 15-16.
63. Id. Justices of the peace courts had been established in each county in 1819. Id. at 10. In
1854, the General Assembly had provided for the election of one or more police magistrates in
each town and city. Id. at 12. The police magistrates had the same jurisdiction as the justices of
the peace in their county, plus jurisdiction in their own town or city over all ordinance cases less
than $100. Id.
64. Id. at 16-17.
65. These were the Circuit Court, Superior Courts, the Family Court, Criminal Court, Probate
Court, County Court, Municipal Court of Chicago, twenty-three city, village, town and municipal
courts, seventy-five justice of the peace courts, and 103 police magistrate courts. Id. at 19. There
was no administrative authority to unify them. Id. See also Wayland B. Cedarquist, The
Continuing Need for Judicial Reform in Illinois, 4 DEPAUL L. REv. 153, 155-58 (1955)
(describing the confusing and complicated system of trial courts that existed in the 1950s in
Illinois).
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To improve this situation, Illinois amended its Constitution by
66
adopting a Judicial Article establishing a unified, three-tier judiciary.
The Article was approved by the voters in 1962 and went into effect on
January 1, 1964.67 It was later incorporated in the current Illinois

Constitution of 1970 as Article VI, 68 creating the current system under
which all judges are elected by voters in partisan elections after being
nominated at primary elections or by petition. 69 Judges run unopposed

in retention elections and must receive 60% of the vote in order to retain
office.

70

The continuation of an elected judiciary in 1970 was by no means
unopposed. 7 1 Earlier in the twentieth century, the perception
elective system was overrun by corruption and inappropriate
influence led to nationwide reform efforts to abolish
judiciaries. 72 In Illinois, attempts to reform the elective system

that the
political
elected
began in

66. See generally Fins, supra note 59, at 186-91 (providing a detailed analysis of the Judicial
Article); Joint Committee on Judicial Article, ProposedJudicialArticle of the Constitutionof the
State of Illinois, Text and Explanatory Summary with Maps Showing JudicialDistricts,41 CIE. B.
REC. 485 (1960) (same); Charles H. Davis, Redistricting the Courts, 50 ILL. B.J. 699 (1962)
(setting forth the provisions for redistricting and reorganizing the supreme and appellate courts
and advocating for the amendment's adoption); Gerald C. Snyder, George Looks at the Judicial
Article, 51 ILL. B.J. 110 (1962) (highlighting future taxpayer benefits that would result from
adoption of the judicial amendment). For a debate on the merits of the Judicial Article, compare
Harry G. Fins, Ten Objections to the Proposed Judicial Article of 1961, 42 CHI. B. REc. 261
(1961) (arguing that the proposed Article's provisions were inconsistent, created double
standards, would destroy state administrative agencies, would deprive trial court judges of
autonomy in their own courts, and would increase the backlog of cases) with Louis A. Kohn &
Charles 0. Brizius, The ProposedJudicialArticle of 1961, Reply to Objections, 42 CI. B. REC.
269 (1961) (countering these objections).
67. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 19; see generally Fins, supra note 59, at 186-88 (describing
efforts throughout the 1950s to create a new Judicial Article, culminating in a successful
compromise that was adopted by the House and Senate in 1961).
68. ROLEWICK, supra note 45, at 29; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
69. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (a). The number of voter signatures required for petitions is
provided by statute. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-3 (West 2006).
70. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12(d). The Constitution of 1970 also substantially revised the judicial
disciplinary system. ROLEWICK, supra, note 45, at 30. It established the Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board, which is permanently convened to receive and investigate complaints against judges. ILL.
CONST. art. 6, § 15 (b), (c). The Board files and prosecutes complaints before the Illinois Courts
Commission, a body with the power to remove, suspend, censure, or reprimand a judge for willful
misconduct, failure to perform his or her duties, or other conduct that is "prejudicial to the
administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute." ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 15
(e). For a discussion of the Commission's purpose, see Wayland B. Cedarquist, The Illinois
Judicial Article: The Proposals for a New Courts Commission and Changes for Trial Court
Judges and Magistrates, 51 CHI. B. REC. 302 (1970) (discussing the necessity of an independent
Courts Commission and its proposed function).
71. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (describing some reform efforts of judicial
election opponents).
72. LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 2-
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the 1950s and continue to this day. 73 The constitutional convention of

1969 served as a platform for debate over judicial selection. 74 After
nearly two decades of advocacy in favor of merit selection 7 5 on the part
of the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association,
two choices were submitted to voters-one called for the continued
partisan election of judges and the other called for judicial merit
selection. 7 6 Although merit selection carried in several counties, it was
77
defeated statewide.

3 (Am. Judicature Soc'y 2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_-.2005.pdf (finding that
elections had not succeeded in freeing the judiciary from control by special interests).
73. See Barnabas F. Sears, Judicial Selection - the Horse Before the Cart, 48 ILL. B.J. 272,
277 (1959) (stating, "... [T]he electorate is afforded 'their God-given right to elect their judges,'
that is to say, elect those who have been selected by the Party on the one hand or the Parties on
the other. That such selection saps the foundation of public and private confidence in the courts,
engenders a spirit of injustice and breeds universal distrust cannot be gainsaid."); Cedarquist,
supra note 65, at 158-59 (calling for judicial selection reform, asserting that "Changes since the
1800's... have too often transformed the popularelection of judges into the political selection of
judges . . With the voters not knowing the candidates, and in no position to weigh their
qualifications, the task of selecting judges in [the] metropolitan centers has more and more been
left to the political parties." (emphasis in original); Illinois: History of JudicialSelection Reform,
AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y (2006), http://www.ajs.org/js/IL-history.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Illinois History] (describing the failed reform efforts).
74. Illinois History, supra note 73. See Richard B. Ogilvie, The Crisis in Our Courts, 51 CHI.
B. REC. 8, 9-10 (1969) (calling for the non-partisan election of judges to be considered at the
convention because the actual selection of judicial candidates falls to political party leaders, not
the voters).
75. See Kenneth A. Manaster, The JudicialArticle: The Proposalfor Merit Selection of Judge
in Illinois, 51 Cm. B. REC. 294 (1970). The proposal for merit selection provided for the
nomination of judges by independent commissions composed of laymen and lawyers, which
would submit three candidates to the Governor for each judicial vacancy. Id. at 295. The
Governor would select a judge for each vacancy from among those candidates. Id. Upon
completion of their first term in office after the Governor's appointment, and at the end of every
subsequent term, the candidate would run unopposed before the voters for retention. Id. The plan
was touted as "the best means for selection of the best possible judges in a manner consistent with
our ideals of democracy." Id.
76. See Wayne W. Whalen, Article VI - The Judicial Article, 52 CHI. B. REC. 88 (1970)
(describing the debate between the bar associations, which supported the merit plan, and the
political parties, which supported election, and advocating for the merit selection plan).
77. The merit plan carried a majority of 68.817% in Cook County. Robert W. Bergstrom,
JudicialReform in Illinois, 53 CHi. B. REC. 9, 9 (1971). Although the merit plan proposal was
defeated statewide, at least one commentator thought "there is a wave of public dissatisfaction
with the method of choosing judges." Id. at 20-21. Other failed reform efforts continued
throughout the 1970s until the present. Illinois History, supra note 73. A coalition of civic
organizations formed a committee in 1971 in order to sponsor a merit selection resolution in each
session of the legislature, which it did from 1973 to 1986. Id. The resolution was put to the floor
twice in that period and failed both times. Id. In 1988, Governor Thompson appointed a task
force on judicial selection, but the task force's proposal died in committee. Tim Franklin &
Daniel Egler, Status Quo Legislature Set For Calls to Action Few Changes So Far In This
Spring's Session, CHI.TRIB. May 29, 1988, Chicagoland at 1 (reporting the defeat of the merit
selection proposal in the Senate Executive Committee); Daniel Egler & Chad Carlton, Judge
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Notwithstanding nationwide reform efforts, thirty-one states use
judicial elections to choose some or all of their judiciaries. 7 8 Illinois is
one of only nine states that initially elects trial court judges in partisan

elections. 79 Illinois joins a smaller group of states, only six, in electing
appellate court judges in partisan elections, and joins seven other states
in electing judges to the highest court. 80 Other states elect some or all
of their judiciaries in non-partisan elections: seventeen states elect trial
court judges 81 and thirteen states elect judges to the highest court in

non-partisan elections. 82

By contrast, twenty-one states use merit

selection or appointment to select trial court judges, 8 3 and thirty states
use merit selection or appointment to select judges of their highest
court.

84

2. Arguments in Favor of Judicial Elections
The fact that about two-thirds of the states elect some or all of their
judiciaries demonstrates that many do not see a conflict between the
85
principle of judicial independence and the popular election of judges.

Indeed, many judicial election proponents deemphasize judicial
independence and stress the importance of judicial accountability to the
public. 86 While acknowledging the tension between these two ideals,

Merit Selection Killed in Committee, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 1 (same); Editorial, More
Demerits on Merit Selection, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 10 (criticizing the defeat of the merit
selection proposal). In 1996, two judicial selection measures were defeated on the senate floor,
one calling for gubernatorial appointment of Supreme Court justices and the other for merit
selection of appellate and circuit judges. Illinois History, supra note 73.
78. BERKSON, supra note 72, at 6.
79. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, APPELLATE AND
GENERAL
JURISDICTION COURTS
4
(2004),
available at http://www.ajs.org/js/
JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES]. The other states
are Alabama, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.
Id.
80. Id. at 5. The other states that elect judges to the court of last resort are Alabama,
Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. at 6.
81. Id. at4.
82. Id. at 4-6.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 4-6.
86. See Dubois, supra note 28, at 34-40 (resolving the tension between judicial independence
and accountability largely in favor of accountability); The Case for PartisanJudicial Elections,
33 U. TOL. L. REv. 393, 404 (2002) (arguing that concurrently scheduled partisan judicial
elections allow voters to hold "judicial policymakers" accountable more than nonconcurrent or
nonpartisan elections); Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and JudicialIndependence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59 (1998) (discussing various aspects of the interplay between judicial
accountability and judicial independence and arguing that independence is compromised most by
disciplinary action against a judge in response to an unfavorable ruling made in good faith, not by
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some proponents posit that the strain can and should be resolved in the
first instance by the voters, allowing them to determine which policy

goals to pursue: an independent and relatively unaccountable judiciary,
or an accountable and politically aware judiciary. 87 That is, the choice
88
to elect judges is a choice to make judges accountable to voters.
These proponents argue that state reformers of the judicial selection

process who lobbied initially for judicial elections wanted judges to be
accountable to the public, not to a group of political elites through an
appointive process. 89 To some of these commentators, strict limitations

on judicial speech and activity impede the flow of information to the
public necessary to realize this goal. 90

Therefore, the choice to elect the judiciary, some would argue,
amounts to a choice in favor of transparency and at least a partial

rejection of judicial independence. 91 According to some proponents,
the element of transparency inherent in the elective process safeguards
the quality and integrity of the judiciary from the potentially corrupting
effects of the political process by revealing candidates' corruption and
biases. 92 Consequently, if the effect of restrictions on judicial speech is
to suggest that candidates have no views on salient issues, voters cannot
discover which candidates are open-minded, bigoted, ignorant, or
unqualified. 93 An uninhibited judicial campaign, on the other hand,

reveals biases, discriminatory prejudices, legal philosophies, and policy
preferences, and highlights candidates with good records and superior

restrictions on judicial speech).
87. Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: JudicialElections,
the FirstAmendment, and Judges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 336-37 (2003).
88. Id. at 312.
89. Id. at 311. However, there is debate about this point--other scholars argue that the goal of
judicial selection reform in early state constitutional history was directed at creating a judiciary
independent from the other branches of government, not a judiciary responsive to popular will.
See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 4, at 672-77 (arguing that the institution of judicial elections was
intended to increase the power and independence of the courts, not establish popular control;
reformers wanted to insulate courts from the partisan politics of the selection process, which
operated through the political branches); Carrington, supra note 58, at 90 ("[T]he advocates of
judicial elections seldom contended that 'the people' would wisely select their judges.").
90. See Swanson, supra note 11, at 86 (arguing that Minnesota's "'censorship regime" before
the United States Supreme Court's decision in White "effected three anti-democratic results:
elections without politics, campaigns without controversy, and candidates without free speech").
Although the author asserts that the purpose of his article is not to argue in favor of judicial
elections, Id. at 113, he presents many of the arguments of election proponents. Id. at 97-100,
104-14.
91. Dimino, supra note 87, at 353.
92. Id. at 345 (the effect of candidate speech restrictions is to make it look like candidates do
not have views on legal issues, making it difficult for voters to distinguish among candidates).
93. Id.; Swanson, supra note 11, at 110.
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qualifications. 94 In doing so, issue-based campaigns for judgeships may
benefit future litigants because thoughtful and qualified candidates can
display their knowledge and attract votes. 95 Litigants could even

potentially benefit by learning about a particular judge's opinions on
96
policy matters and planning their arguments accordingly.

In a different approach, some commentators assert that judicial
campaigns actually do not damage the independence of the judiciary
any more than other selection methods, such as appointive systems. 9 7 It
is unrealistic, and furthermore impossible, they argue, to insist that
judges remain completely independent of politics. 9 8 It has been proven
that policy perspectives affect judicial decision-making, 99 and
pretending otherwise gives voters the false impression that policy

considerations will not affect judicial judgment or vice-versa. 100 They
argue that politics will always inform the judicial selection process,

even in an appointive system, in the sense that competing interests on
the appointing committee will understand the policy effects of choosing
a particular judge and will choose accordingly.l 0 1 If political affiliation
and philosophy will inevitably be an important factor in judicial
selection, why not allow voters to make the political choice? 10 2
94. Dimino, supra note 87, at 345 (discussing the benefits to litigants and attorneys when
judges' views are known).
95. Id. at 354.
96. Id.
97. Id.; The Case for PartisanJudicial Elections, supra note 86, at 397-405 (criticizing merit
selection and appointive systems).
98. Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judicial Activism, Judges' Speech, and Merit Selection:
Conventional Wisdom and Nonsense, 68 ALB. L. REV. 557, 560 (2005) (arguing that "political
affiliation and philosophy are often, if not always, a primary consideration in judicial selection").
See generally Lubet, supra note 86, at 63 (arguing that even strict limits on campaign speech do
not threaten judicial independence as a personal or institutional matter, because restricting speech
cannot cause a judge to be "more or less fair and impartial upon taking the bench.").
99. See Dimino, supra note 87, at 348 (citing Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in
State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1123 (1987)
(arguing that constituent values deter state supreme court justices from voting in accordance with
their preferences where they are perceived as inconsistent with those of constituents) and Melinda
Gann Hall, ElectoralPolitics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 43839 (1992) (arguing that state supreme court justices vote with the court majority in order to
appease their constituencies, where dissenting would be popular); Jackson Williams,
IrreconcilablePrinciples: Law, Politics, and the Illinois Supreme Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
267 (1998) (examining the behavior of Illinois Supreme Court Justices in cases where the
electoral and legal systems conflict, and concluding that there is likely an appearance of political
influence on the court); Bonventre, supra note 98, at 562 ("A judicial robe is not an ideological
lobotomy.").
100. Dimino, supra note 87, at 348; Bonventre, supra note 98, at 561 (arguing that judges are
always political at least in the Aristotelian sense that their decisions affect the body politic).
101. Dimino, supra note 87, at 348-49.
102. Bonventre, supra note 98, at 560; The Casefor PartisanJudicial Elections, supra note
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Consistent with this argument, election proponents assert that
absence of judicial bias is a false ideal. 10 3 Some posit that speech
10 4
restrictions do not eliminate actual bias, but only manifestations of it.

In reality, they contend, a biased judge could be chosen in an elective
state as well as an appointive state; in the elective state, however, voters
would know he or she was biased and could respond. 10 5 If judges make
unpopular policy judgments in instances where the law does not compel
10 6
a certain result, voters should determine which policies are served.
Supporters of judicial elections contend that placing the choice in the
hands of voters will preserve, not degrade, the integrity of the
judiciary. 10 7 This assertion rests on the belief that the response of
public opinion to unacceptable private speech will discourage unethical
behavior on the part of judges and candidates. 10 8 In other words,
proponents of judicial elections trust the democratic process to select
able, qualified candidates for the bench. 10 9
3. Criticism of Judicial Elections
Critics of judicial elections and supporters of ethical restrictions on
judicial conduct insist that there is a compelling state interest in
ensuring the independence of the judiciary, and that it should be served

either by the enforcement of strict ethical restrictions or by removing

86, at 407 ("[Y]ou cannot take the politics out of decisions about who is going to hold what
office, but you can take the people out of the politics.")
103. See Swanson, supra note 11, at 107-08 (discussing "The Myth of the Tabula Rasa
Judicial Mind").
104. Dimino, supra note 87, at 346; Bonventre, supra note 98, at 562 (pointing out that
prohibitions on judicial speech and activity do not conceal judges' ideological leanings, so we
cannot avoid those beliefs-what should be avoided, according to the author, is the prejudgment
of an issue that is or may come before the judge). Other election proponents trust speech
restrictions as a method of ensuring that judicial elections are conducted differently than other
elections. See Schotland, supra note 12 (urging states not to limit the safeguards that surround
judicial elections, such as regulations on campaigns).
105. Dimino, supra note 87, at 346.
106. See id. at 378 (contending that because judicial decisions have policy consequences,
public involvement by voters in shaping their states' policy is part of democratic selfgovernment).
107. Swanson, supra note 11, at 112-13.
108. Id. at 112-13 (quoting Justice Kennedy: "The legal profession, the legal academy, the
press, voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all interested citizens can use their own
First Amendment freedoms to protest statements inconsistent with standards of judicial neutrality
and judicial excellence." Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
109. Swanson, supra note 11, at 113; Schotland, supra note 12, at 662 (asserting that the
original goal of judicial selection by popular election was to obtain an "able, respected, and
enlightened judiciary," independent from the legislative branch).
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judges from the elective process. 110 Alexander Hamilton viewed the
independence of the judiciary as essential to the protection of individual
rights and the safety of the Constitution from the encroachment of the

other two branches, noting that judicial independence is "peculiarly
essential in a limited constitution."1 1 1 Critics of judicial elections argue
that the judiciary should be independent in at least two senses:
independent of the other two branches, as well as independent from
1 12
external influences, including the influences of the political arena.
This dichotomy has also been characterized as "decisional" versus
113
"institutional" independence.
Independence from the political arena is important to critics of

judicial elections because of the perceived power of judges to thwart or
validate the will of the voting majority. 114 When a judge's decisional
independence is compromised by fear of losing the next election, the
constitutional rights of individuals and minorities are jeopardized and
the impartial administration of justice may be compromised. 115 For
judges who are up for retention, it may be difficult to vindicate the
constitutional rights of individuals or minorities where the will of the
110. See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence - An Exegesis, 29
URB. L.J. 835, 838 (2002) ("Trying to maintain our experiment in self government
without a truly independent judiciary is like trying to push a rope. It just won't work.").
t11.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
University Press 1961)., Hamilton goes on to write, "Th[e] independence of the judges is equally
requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the mean time to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community." Id. at 527.
112. Honorable Clarence Thomas, Address at the Federalist Society's Annual National
Convention Banquet: On Judicial Independence (Nov. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Thomas Address];
see Weiser, supra note 4, at 677 (articulating a "working definition" of judicial independence:
An independent judiciary is: (1) not dominated by or dependent on the other two
branches of government; (2) not unduly entangled in the political machinery of the
other branches, such as the political party apparatus by which legislators and elected
executive officials organize themselves and their supporters; and (3) not actuated in its
decision-making by the same considerations and interests as the other branches);
Lubet, supra note 86, at 61. Lubet concludes that the components of judicial independence are
"fairness, impartiality, and good faith." An independent judge gives every litigant "a full and fair
opportunity to be heard," "presides impartially, free from extraneous influences" and "rules in
good faith, determined to follow the law as she understands it, unmindful of possible personal,
political, or financial repercussion." Id.
113. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1012; Frances Kahn Zemas, The Accountable Judge:
Guardianof JudicialIndependence, 72 S. CALL. REV. 625, 628-31 (1999).
114. Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. R. 689, 708 (1995).
115. Id.at726.
FORDHAM
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majority demands the opposite result. 1 16 Additionally, more than
constitutional interests may be at stake when a judge deems it necessary
to consider popular will when making decisions. 1 17 Electoral pressure
may lead judges, for example, to sentence criminal defendants in
1 18
accordance with popular sentiments rather than the rule of law.
Therefore, critics argue, electoral independence is vital to protecting the
constitutional rights of individuals and minorities from the will of the
majority. 1 19 Freedom from external pressures safeguards the ability of
judges to base their decisions solely on "a good faith interpretation of
120
the laws, the Constitution, and the facts of an individual case."
Critics of judicial elections point to empirical studies suggesting that
elected judges are more likely to be swayed by politics in their decisionmaking than appointed or merit-selected judges.12 1 Elected judges, they
assert, are more motivated to vote with political interests because of
policy preferences, the desire to maintain harmony with other judges on
the court, career objectives, or personal standing and respect in the
community. 12 2 Critics argue that this evidence of bias or the appearance
23
of bias diminishes the Court's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 1
Furthermore, critics argue, judicial elections do not operate to make
judges more accountable to voters. 12 4 Where there are restrictions on
judicial speech and activity during elections, the flow of information to
voters is severely limited. 125 As a result, the voters are apathetic about
judicial candidates and either do not vote or rely principally on voting
cues like party identification, ethnic surname, or incumbency to choose
candidates. 126 Critics contend that the reality of judicial elections,

116. Id.at727.
117. Id. at 728.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 708. The natural counterargument to this point made by election proponents is that
insulating judges from the will of the majority renders them partially or wholly unaccountable to
the people, who are the final legitimate source of political power in a democracy. Id. Since
judges are the final interpreters of the Constitution, it can and does happen that judges thwart the
will of the majority. Id.
120. Carlton, supra note 110, at 839.
121. See supra note 99 (referencing studies examining the various influences and biases that

affect judicial decision-making).
122. Williams, supra note 99, at 319-20.
123. Id. at 320.
124. Steven Zeidman, JudicialPolitics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV.
713, 717-18 (2005) (discussing voter apathy with respect to judicial elections in New York).
125. Philip L. Dubois, Significance of Voting Cues in State Supreme Court Elections, 13 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 757, 759 (1979).
126. Zeidman, supra note 124, at 717-18 (citing the author's own study of voter participation
in the State of New York); Dubois, supra note 125, at 758-59; Anthony Champagne & Kyle
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therefore, is that a small number of uninformed, relatively apathetic
voters choose the candidate whose name they recognize or the candidate
affiliated with the political party they support. 127 Additionally, low
voter turnout in judicial elections means that those who vote do not
represent the "average voter." 12 8 Rather, the persons who vote are
12 9
likely those with narrow interests in the election of particular judges.
The conclusion in either case is that the "will of the people" does not
130
likely prevail in most judicial elections.

B. Ethics and PoliticalActivity in JudicialElections

Early in the last century, concerns expressed in the debate about
judicial elections regarding the effect of political considerations on

some judges led to the creation of ethical rules governing judicial
conduct. 131 Although some form of judicial ethics code now exists in
every state, states with an elected judiciary are especially dependent on
ethical restrictions to mitigate the potentially negative effects of the
This Section explains the origins of these
elective process. 132
restrictions in the Model Code. 13 3 It then discusses the Illinois Code
and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board, striking down the "announce clause" of the Illinois Code, 134 and
it sets forth the content of the Illinois Code's restrictions on judicial
political speech and activity. 135 Next, this Section summarizes the

Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a Case Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 926
(2002) (arguing that voter unfamiliarity with judicial candidates makes party labels important
cues); Kyle Cheek, Reconciling Normative and Empirical Approaches to Judicial Selection
Reform: Lessons from a Bellwether State, 68 ALB. L. REv. 577, 580 (2005) (The author cites one
example from Texas, where a "political novice" defeated a well known and respected challenger
for an open seat on the Texas Supreme Court, allegedly only because he had a familiar name with
almost identical spelling and pronunciation to that of a former Texas gubernatorial candidate.).
127. Zeidman, supra note 124, at 718 (arguing that the power to select judges is vested with
political party leaders).
128. Croley, supra note 114, at 733 n.134.
129. Professor Croley suggests that two groups come to mind: those who are frequently
parties to cases before the elected judges, and those who routinely appear as counsel before the
elected judges. Id.
130. Id.
131. See infra Part ll.B. 1 (describing the origins of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
132. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 665-70 (arguing that ethics canons restricting judicial
speech serve a compelling state interest that deserves deference particularly in the context of
judicial elections).
133. See infra Part II.B. I (explaining the history and purpose of the Model Code).
134. See infra Part I.B.1 (summarizing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Buckley v. Ill.
JudicialInquiry Bd.).
135. See infra Part II.B.1 (summarizing revisions to the Illinois Code made in light of
Buckley).
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United States Supreme Court's opinion in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White finding a similar "announce clause" in the
Minnesota Judicial Code of Conduct unconstitutional. 13 6 It then

reviews White's application to other restrictions on judicial activity in
subsequent federal and state decisions. 137 Lastly, this Section examines
proposed revisions to the Model Code, drafted in response to White, and
1 38
litigation testing the scope of its holding.

1. The Model Code and Its Development in Illinois
The Model Code restricts the political speech and activity of judges

in an effort to safeguard the integrity, impartiality, and independence of
the judiciary. 139 The predecessor to the current Model Code was the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, approved by the American Bar Association
("ABA") in 1924 as the first formal attempt to articulate ethical and
moral standards for members of the judiciary. 140 In 1972, the ABA
extensively revised the Canons, condensing the original thirty-six into
seven and reworking the formerly hortatory language. 14 1 The ABA
revisited the Code in 1990, reducing seven canons to five by combining
the rules relating to off-the-bench conduct and adding a preamble and
terminology section. 142 Since the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics, the
Model Code evolved from an attempt to inspire judges to comport
themselves with dignity and restraint to a detailed code that mixes

136. See infra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Republican Party of Minn. v. White).
137. See infra Part ll.B.3 (examining subsequent decisions applying the principles announced
in White).
138. See infra Part Il.B.4 (examining proposed revisions to the Model Code).
139. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1990).
140. Background paper about the Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS'N (2006), http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/about/background.html.
[hereinafter Background Paper]. The necessity of the Canons of Judicial Ethics became apparent
in 1922 when a federal district judge supplemented his $7,500 federal judicial salary with
$42,500 a year to serve as national commissioner of baseball. Id.
141. Eileen Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 44 No. 1.
JUDGES' J. 7 (2005). For example, Canon 1 of the 1924 Canons, entitled "Relations of the
Judiciary" stated, "The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in
respect to his personal conduct which concern his relation to the state and its inhabitants, the
litigants before him, the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court, and the witnesses,
jurors, and attendants who aid him in the administration of its functions." LISA L. MILORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 132 (1992). Canon 6, entitled "Industry," stated, "A
judge should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed on him."
Id. at 133.
142. Id.
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hortatory language with a rubric of acceptable and unacceptable
43
activity. 1
In 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a modified form of the
Model Code. 14 4 The Illinois Code then included certain Model Code
provisions restricting the speech of judicial candidates. 145 Canon 7,
Rule 67(B)(1)(c) provided that a judicial candidate
should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office" or
"announce his views on disputed legal or political issues ... provided,
however, that he may announce his views on measures to improve the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if, in doing so,
he does not cast doubt on his
capacity to decide impartially any issue
14 6
that may come before him.
In 1993, in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, the Seventh
Circuit held these clauses of Rule 67(B)(1)(c) unconstitutional as
inconsistent with the First Amendment. 147 Judge Posner, writing for the
court, articulated two principles that must be reconciled: first,
candidates should be free to state their position on issues that are
important to voters; 14 8 second, judges should decide cases according to
the law rather than with any express or implied commitments made
during a campaign. 149 The Illinois Code unconstitutionally favored the
latter principle too strongly by forbidding "all pledges or promises
except a promise that the candidate will faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of his judicial office." 150 This language did not
limit the clause to issues likely to come before the court.15 1 Rather, it
reached beyond speech that could reasonably be interpreted as
committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his
impartiality. 15 2 Even the "announce clause" was not limited merely to
143. Id.
144.

145.
2006).
146.
147.
148.
149.

ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; SUP. CT. R.

61-67 (West 2006).

ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (B)(1)(c); SUP. CT. R. 67 (B)(1)(c) (West
Id.
Buckley v. I11.Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 227.
Id. The court stated, "The roots of both principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage.

...Whatever their respective pedigrees, only a fanatic would suppose that one of the principles
should give way completely to the other . . ." Id. Furthermore, the Court did not "understand
the plaintiffs to be arguing that because Illinois has decided to make judicial office mainly
elective rather than (as in the federal system) wholly appointive, it has in effect redefined judges
as legislator or executive branch officials ..... Id. at 228.

150. Id. at 228.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
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153
statements about how a candidate intends to rule in particular cases.
The court found that under a reasonable construction of the rule, the
only safe response was silence. 154 The Court concluded that although
the principle of "impartial justice under law" is strong enough to
warrant government restrictions on the freedom of judicial speech, it is
not so strong as to place that speech entirely outside of the
155
constitutional guarantee of the First Amendment.
The Illinois Supreme Court responded to this decision in 1993 by
narrowing the speech restrictions accordingly: "A candidate for judicial
office ... shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies,
or issues within cases
' 15 6
court."
the
before
come
to
that are likely
Concurring in the Court's approval of amendments to the Illinois
Code in 1993, Justice Heiple remarked that the Illinois Code attempts to
recognize that Illinois has an elective judiciary. As a practical matter,
the Illinois judge must involve himself in matters political . . .
Realistically speaking, it is not enough for the judge or candidate to
merely give name, rank and serial number as though he were a
prisoner of war. Rather, the public has a right to know the candidate's
core beliefs on matters of deep conviction and principle .... In so
doing, however, the judge or judicial candidate ought to refrain from
stultifying himself as to his evenhanded participation in future
cases. 157
The current Illinois Code seeks the harmony between informed voters
and evenhanded judges that Justice Heiple spoke of by restricting
judicial speech through the "commit clause," stated above, a
"misrepresent clause," and by enumerating permissible and
impermissible political activity. 15 8 The "misrepresent clause" prohibits
a judge or candidate from "knowingly misrepresent[ing] the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or

153. Id. Instead, the court found that the candidate "may not announce his views on disputed
legal or political issues, period." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
154. Id. Although the silence was temporary, because the restrictions only applied during
campaigns, the court found that "interference with the marketplace of ideas and opinions is at its
zenith when the 'customers' are most avid for the market's 'product."' Id. at 228-29.
155. Id. at231.
156. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (A)(3)(d)(i); SUP. CT. R. 67 (A)(3)(d)(i)
(West 2006).
157. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 cmt. (West 2006) (Heiple, J. concurring,
Aug. 6,1993 amendment).
158. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (A)(3)(d)(i); SUP. CT. R. 67 (A)(3)(d)(i)
(West 2006); see Hon. Patrick E. McGann, Ethical Campaign Practices for Illinois Judicial
Candidates, 90 ILL. B.J. 76 (2002) (summarizing permissible and impermissible campaign
activities).
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However, a judge may respond to "personal attacks or

attacks on the candidate's record" provided that his or her response does
16 0
not violate the "misrepresent" or "commit" clauses.
Under the Illinois Code, a judge or judicial candidate cannot act as a
leader or officer in a political organization, 16 1 publicly endorse or
oppose another candidate for public office (except while campaigning
for judicial office), 162 make speeches on behalf of a political
organization, 163 or solicit funds for, or pay an assessment to, a political
organization or candidate. 164 However, a judge or candidate may
identify himself as a member of a political party, 16 5 contribute to a
political organization, 16 6 and purchase tickets for and attend political
67
gatherings.1
While campaigning for judicial office, a candidate may speak to
gatherings on her own behalf,16 8 appear in media advertisements to
support her candidacy, 16 9 distribute promotional literature supporting
her candidacy, 170 and publicly endorse or oppose other judicial
candidates running in the same election. 17 1 Despite a candidate's
freedom to conduct a public campaign and attend political gatherings, a
172
candidate may not personally solicit campaign contributions.
Instead, all fund raising activities must be conducted by a campaign

159. ILL Code Canon 7 (A)(3)(d)(ii).
160. Id. Canon 7 (A)(3)(e). Among other objections to the amendments, Justice McMorrow
dissented from their adoption on the grounds that "publicly 'correcting' what the judge regards as
a misstatement of fact in a judicial campaign ... should continue to be prohibited. Most issues of
'fact' in the context of judicial elections are, at best, mixed issues of fact and opinion and at worst
pure issues of opinion. Thus, the 'narrow' exception anticipated by the draftspersons would, in
reality, become a large loophole." Id. Canon 7 cmt. (McMorrow, J., dissenting, Aug. 6, 1993
amendment, quoting the Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance at 5-6).
161. Id. Canon 7 (A)(1) (a).
162. Id. Canon 7 (A)(1) (b).
163. Id. Canon 7 (A)(1) (c).
164. Id. Canon 7 (A)(1) (d).
165. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(a)(ii).
166. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(a)(iii).
167. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(a)(i). Justice McMorrow objected that "the new standards of the rule
are too permissive with respect to the political activities of judicial candidates. The increased
permissiveness in judicial candidates' political activities fosters a misguided over-politicization of
the judicial election process in this State." Id. Canon 7 cmt. (McMorrow, J., dissenting, Aug. 6,
1993 amendment). She further found that the amendments were "imprudent, unnecessary, and
len[t] themselves to abuse." Id.
168. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(b)(i).
169. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(b)(ii).
170. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(b)(iii).
171. Id. Canon 7 (B) (1)(b)(iv).
172. Id. Canon 7 (B)(2).
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committee of "responsible persons" who may solicit and accept
"reasonable campaign contributions," manage the campaign, and solicit
17 3
public support for the candidate.
2. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
About ten years after Buckley, the United States Supreme Court
considered similar provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. 174 The Court
declared that the states cannot prohibit a judicial candidate from
"announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues"
consistent with the First Amendment. 175 The Court examined the
clause under strict scrutiny, analyzing whether the announce clause was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in preserving the
76
impartiality and appearance of impartiality of the judiciary. 1
To decide this question, Justice Scalia discussed three possible
meanings of "impartiality."' 177 The traditional sense of the word is
"lack of bias" with respect to a party to the proceeding, which
guarantees that a judge will apply the law in the same way to every
litigant. 178 A second possible meaning of impartiality is "lack of
preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view."' 17 9 The
Court found that this meaning of impartiality was not even a compelling
state interest because a lack of predisposition with respect to legal issues
is not necessary to achieve equal justice for two reasons. 180 First, the
Court noted that it is virtually impossible to find a judge without
preconceptions about the law. 18 1 Second, the Court stated that having a
173. Id. The rule further states, "Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and
accepting reasonable campaign contributions and public support from lawyers.' Id.
174. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
175. Id. at 788.
176. Id. at 774.
177. Id. at 775-81.
178. Id. at 775-76.
179. Id. at 777 (emphasis in original). This sense of impartiality would be concerned with
allowing every litigant "an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points in their case."
Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. The Court quoted then-Justice Rehnquist stating,
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be

unusual if they had not by that time fonnulated at least some tentative notions that
would influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution
and their interaction with one another.

It would be not merely unusual, but

extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their
previous legal careers.
Id. at 777-78 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., memorandum

opinion)).
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judge whose mind was a complete "tabula rasa" with respect to
constitutional and legal issues would be undesirable as evidence of a
' 182
"lack of qualification, not a lack of bias."
' 183
The third possible meaning of impartiality is "open-mindedness."
This type of impartiality would require a judge to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions and remain open to persuasion, guaranteeing
each litigant at least some chance of winning legal arguments in the
case. 184 The Court found that impartiality in this sense might be
desirable, but that the announce clause was not adopted for that
185
purpose.
Although the Court found a compelling state interest in the first
meaning of impartiality, lack of bias for or against parties to the
proceeding, the clause was "barely tailored" to achieve it because it
restricted speech for or against particular issues, not parties. 186 The
Court held that the "announce clause" covered more than promises to
decide issues in a particular way. 187 Rather, it extended to a candidate's
mere statement of position with respect to an issue, even if she did not
promise to maintain that position after the election. 188 Thus finding that
the clause was not narrowly tailored because it was overinclusive of
judicial speech, the Court also found the clause underinclusive insofar
89
as it prohibited announcements only during campaigns. 1
The Court also expressed guarded disapproval of judicial
elections. 190 Justice Scalia noted the "obvious tension" between
Minnesota's choice to elect its judiciary and the announce clause, which
19 1
prohibited candidates from speaking on subjects of interest to voters.
Concurring, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to openly express
her disapproval of judicial elections, stating, "If the State has a problem
182. Id. Tabula rasa is Latin for "-clean slate."
183. Id. at 778.
184. Id. The Court stated, "This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an
equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so." Id,
(emphasis in original).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 776.
187. Id. at 770.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 783. The Court stated that "this underinclusiveness cannot be explained by resort
to the notion that the First Amendment provides less protection during an election campaign than

at other times." Id.
190. Id. at 787, 792.
191. Id. at 787. Justice Scalia stated that opposition to judicial elections "may be well taken."

Id. He went on to note, however, that, "If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing
power of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process
the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles." Id. at 788 (internal citations omitted).
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with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself
92
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges." 1
3. After White: Determining the Scope of
Judges' First Amendment Freedoms
Most judges and commentators agree that there is a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the scope of White's holding. 19 3 When the case
was decided, most states had already eliminated the "announce clause"
from their ethics canons.194 Although White restricted its analysis to the
"announce" clause, litigation testing the scope of its holding placed
other provisions curbing political speech and activity of judges under
195
the strict scrutiny microscope.
First, on remand from the Supreme Court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in White held that the "partisan activities
clause" and "solicitation clause" of the Minnesota Code were also
unconstitutional. 196 Applying strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit found
that the provisions "chill[ed], even kill[ed]" political speech and
197
associational rights.
According to the Eighth Circuit, the "partisan activities clause"
prohibited judges or candidates from identifying themselves as
members of a political organization, except as necessary to vote, and
from attending political gatherings. 198 It also prohibited seeking,
accepting or using endorsements from a political organization. 19 9 The
court found that the clause was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest in impartiality 20 0 because, in preventing judges
from aligning with a particular political party, it tried to prevent judges
192. Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1041 (D.N.D. 2005) ("[t]o
say there is considerable uncertainty regarding the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in
White is an understatement.").
194. Cynthia Gray, The States' Response to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 86
JUDICATURE 163, 163 (2002).
195. See Cynthia Gray, Developments Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002) AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y (Aug. 29, 2006), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/
pdfs/DevelopmentsafterWhite.pdf (documenting litigation nationwide interpreting the White
decision); Cynthia Gray, The Limits of White, 89 JUDICATURE 315 (2006) (reviewing the other
contexts to which White has been applied) [hereinafter Gray, The Limits of White].
196. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738,766 (8th Cir. 2005).
197. Id. at 746.
198. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (A)(1).

199. Id.
200. White, 416 F.3d at 753 (adopting the Supreme Court's definition of impartiality, lack of
bias for or against either party to a proceeding, as the compelling state interest advanced by the
state).
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20 1
from aligning with particular views for or against issues, not parties.
Like the announce clause invalidated by the Supreme Court, the Eighth
Circuit found the partisan activities clause "woefully underinclusive" in
its attempt to ensure the third possible meaning of impartiality, open20 2
mindedness.
The "solicitation clause" prohibited a judge or candidate from
personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions or publicly
stated support. 20 3 Candidates could form campaign committees for
these purposes, but the committees could not disclose to the candidate
the identity of contributors or those who were solicited. 20 4 The Court
found that the state could pursue its interest in judicial impartiality by
insulating judges from the influence of donations from individuals who
may come before the court.20 5 However, Minnesota's solicitation
clause was not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest since it
prohibited judges from learning the identity of parties who did or did
20 6
not contribute in the first place.

A different provision was invalidated in 2002, in Weaver v. Bonner,
where the Eleventh Circuit held that a provision of the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting a candidate from negligently making false
statements or true statements that are misleading or deceptive did not
20 7
afford the requisite "breathing space" to judicial speech under White.
The provision violated the "overbreadth doctrine" because the "chilling
effect of . . . absolute accountability for factual misstatements is
incompatible with an atmosphere of free discussion contemplated by the
20 8
First Amendment."
The Weaver Court also followed the Eighth Circuit in holding that a
prohibition on personally soliciting campaign contributions or publicly

201. Id. at 754.
202. Id. at 756.
203. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (B)(2).
204. Id.
205. White, 416 F.3d at 765.
206. Id.
207. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (1lth Cir. 2002). The provision stated that
candidates shall not:
use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which the candidate
knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make
the communication considered as a whole not materially misleading or which is likely
to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidates can achieve.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (B)(1)(d) (West 2006).
208. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319.
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stated support was unconstitutional. 20 9 The clause failed strict scrutiny
because it allowed a candidate's election committee to engage in the
same activities. 2 10 Therefore, the rule did not significantly reduce the
risk of impartiality, since the election winners would feel beholden to
their supporters regardless of who solicited their support. 2 11 The
Eleventh Circuit interpreted White to suggest "that the standard for
judicial elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and
2 12
executive elections."
Three more Model Code restrictions were held unconstitutional in
2003 in Spargo v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct.2 13 In
response to pending disciplinary proceedings, 2 14 an elected judge in
New York challenged provisions of the New York Code which 1)
directed judges to maintain "high standards of conduct" to preserve "the
integrity and independence of the judiciary," 2) instructed judges to
avoid the "appearance of impropriety," and 3) prohibited incumbent
judges and candidates from engaging in partisan political activities
unrelated to their campaign, and required candidates to "maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office." 2 15 The District Court found these
provisions "void for vagueness" in that the language did not inform "a
person of any level of intelligence" what conduct is prohibited.2 16
According to the Court, the clauses lacked specificity and were likely to
lead judges and judicial candidates to severely limit their conduct in
order to avoid a violation. 2 17 The Second Circuit, on abstention
grounds, vacated the district court's judgment holding the New York
Code provisions facially unconstitutional.2 1 8
209. Id. at 1322.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1322-23.
212. Id.at 1321.
213. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
214. Disciplinary proceedings on the part of the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct were pending against the judge for, among other activities, providing cider and donuts to
attract voters, accepting the District Attorney as a client where the DA's office regularly appeared
before the judge, presiding over criminal cases prosecuted by the DA's office without disclosing
that the judge had previously represented the DA's campaign committee (which still owed him
legal fees), attending sessions during the November 2000 Florida recount of presidential votes,

participating in a demonstration against the recount process, and serving as keynote speaker at a
fundraiser for the Monroe County Conservative Party. Id. at 79-81.
215. Id.
at 81-82.
216. Id. at 92.
217. Id. at 90-91. "How would anyone know that handing out donuts would constitute a
failure to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary while serving cake [at a reception
where the candidate is introduced] would not?" Id. at 91.
218. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 68 (2nd Cir. 2003).
Abstention was at issue because state disciplinary proceedings were pending against the plaintiff
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Another challenge to the New York Code of Judicial Conduct upheld
its provisions in 2003.219 In In re Watson, a judge petitioned for review
of the disciplinary commission's finding of misconduct on the basis of
his campaign slogan asking voters to "put a real prosecutor on the
bench. ' 220 During his campaign the candidate stated, "[w]e are in
desperate need of a Judge who will work with the police, not against
them," and urged voters to elect him so that he could "send a message"
that criminal conduct would not be tolerated. 22 1 The candidate later
admitted that he violated the Code, but before the Commission issued a
determination, White was decided.22 2 After considering the impact of
White, the commission distinguished New York's "pledges and
promise" rule from the "announce clause" invalidated in White and
sustained the finding of misconduct. 22 3 Finding that White did not
"compel" a particular result, the Court declined to hold the "pledges and
22 4
promises" clause unconstitutional.
In a similar case in 2003, In re Raab, a New York judge challenged
the Code's restrictions on political activities. 22 5 The judge faced
censure for making a lump sum payment by personal check to the
Democratic Committee, participating in a "phone bank" on behalf of a
legislative candidate, attending a candidate screening for prospective
candidates for judicial and non-judicial office, and making statements to
a lawyer that could be construed as a threat. 2 26 The Court declined to
extend White in order to invalidate the restrictions on political activity,

when the federal suit was filed. Id. Two of the judges' political supporters also joined the federal
case as plaintiffs. Id.at 66. The District Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the
judge's claim, but decided the political supporters' claims since neither were parties to the
disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 68. The Second Circuit held that the claims were intertwined, so
that "proper deference to New York's paramount interest in regulating its own judicial system
mandates the exercise of Younger abstention" over the entirety of the action. Id.
219. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2003).
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 2-3.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id. at 6, 8.
225. In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003). The Code prohibited New York judges from
engaging in "any partisan political activity," including making speeches on behalf of a political
organization or candidate, attending political gatherings, or soliciting funds for or contributing to

a political organization. Id. at 1285 n.2.
226. Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1288-89. The attorney appealed an ex parte restraining order
signed by the judge that was later vacated. Id. at 1289. The judge told the lawyer he would be on
the bench another I1 years and had a "long memory," and that it was a "'good thing" the firm did

not practice matrimonial law [the division to which the judge was assigned]. Id.
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noting that White did not involve review of political activity
2 27
restrictions.
A United States District Court in Kentucky reached an opposite result
in Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky v. Wolnitzek in 2004 after
considering a challenge to the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct's
"pledges and promises" clause, "commit" clause, and recusal
requirements. 2 28 The Court issued a preliminary and permanent
injunction barring enforcement of the promises and commitment
clauses, 2 29 holding that the clauses operated to restrict judicial speech to
the same extent as an "announce clause" of the type invalidated in
23 0
White.

The Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission and other appellants
filed an emergency motion to stay the District Court's injunction in
Wolnitzek. 23 1 Relying on White, the Sixth Circuit denied the motion
and upheld the District Court's finding that the "pledges and promises"
and "commit" clauses were likely unconstitutional. 232 The Court found
that the difference between the "promises" and "commit" clauses and
the "announce clause" in White was a difference in name only, because
the State had enforced the promises and commit clauses "as a de facto
announce clause."

2 33

The following year, in 2005, a United States District Court followed
Kentucky in North Dakota Family Alliance v. Bader, holding that the
North Dakota Code "pledges and promises" and "commit" clauses were
unconstitutional.2 3 4
The Court found that after White, judicial
candidates clearly may express their views on current legal and political
issues without fear of ethical sanction. 2 35 The Court also found that the
clauses at issue prohibit the same speech that was constitutionally

227. Id. at 1290.
228. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
The Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct provided that a judge or candidate must not "make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office" or "make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." Id. at 676. The
Kentucky Code's recusal statute requires a judge to disqualfy himself where "his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 676-77.
229. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
230. Id. at 695.
231. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224, 244
(6th Cir. 2004).
232. Id. at 228.
233. Id. at 227.
234. N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005).
235. Id. at 1028.
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protected under White, because there is no real distinction between
announcing one's views on issues and making statements that
commit
236
or appear to commit a candidate with respect to those issues.
Citing Bader, the Court in Alaska Right to Life Political Action
Committee v. Feldman in 2005 reached the same result. 237 The Court
held that Alaska's Code, when viewed as mandatory rather than
advisory, could not prohibit judges standing for retention from
responding to questionnaires consistent with White.2 38 The Code's
disqualification requirement, however, was found narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest in assuring parties that judges will
apply the law in the same manner to every litigant, and was therefore
239
constitutional.
The principles announced in White also impacted the debate
surrounding contributions to judicial campaigns. A Florida District

Court found that making campaign contributions or serving on a judge's
election committee do not constitute grounds for disqualifying a
defendant's attorney in a criminal prosecution. 240 A concurring opinion

remarked that the applicable precedents arose "when aspirations for
judicial elections were high and professional influences restrained
judicial candidates." 24 1 In contrast, after White, the justice stated that
judicial elections are no longer distinguishable from elections of other

candidates. 24 2 In this new landscape, the justice argued that judicial
candidates can and must campaign for office like legislative and
executive candidates. 243 The justice opined that "[i]f such a regime is
too disruptive to the operation of courts, well then maybe we should
2 44
rethink our dedication to the direct election of judges."
4. The ABA's Proposed Revisions to the Model Code
In light of White and the resulting confusion regarding judicial ethical
standards, the ABA concluded it was necessary to comprehensively reevaluate the Model Code. 24 5 In August 2003, the ABA appointed a
Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the

236.
237.
Alaska
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 1039-42.
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D.
2005).
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Braynen v. State, 895 So.2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 1170 (Farmer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Backgroundpaper,supra note 140, at 4.
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Joint Commission).2 4 6 The Joint Commission proposes significant
substantive and structural revisions to the Model Code in the Final Draft
Report, issued for public comment in 2005.247 Structurally, the Final
Draft Report reorganizes the Model Code by presenting the Canons in a
new format.2 4 8 For example, the Model Code states broad principles in
"Canons" which are followed by commentary that illustrates the
boundaries of permissible and impermissible judicial conduct. 249 In
contrast, the Final Draft Report resembles the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct-mandatory rules followed by commentary to
250
assist the reader in interpreting and applying the rules.
The Joint Commission's intention in restructuring and revising Canon
5 of the Model Code on political activity echoes the words of Justice
Heiple. 25 1 It attempts to balance the "political realities of judicial
selection" against the principles of "judicial integrity, independence,
' 252
and impartiality."
The ABA expresses a clear preference for merit selection as the best
method of judicial selection. 253 Nevertheless, both the Model Code and
the Final Draft Report state principles that are meant to apply in all
states, including those that elect their judiciaries. 25 4 To achieve this
end, the Model Code is divided into different versions. 255 Canon 5
announces principles that are applicable to "All Judges and
Candidates," 2 56 those that are applicable to judges and candidates
seeking appointment, 2 57 and those applicable to judges and candidates
for elective office. 2 58 The result appears incongruous because it permits

246. Gallagher, supra note 141, at 7.
247. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Introduction, at 3 (Final Draft Report 2005),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport'html
248. Id. at 3.
249. Id.
250. Id. The Joint Commission believes that this structure will be "more straightforward and
user-friendly." Id.
251. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (Justice Heiple's concurrence in the 1993
amendment to the Illinois Code).
252. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Introduction, at 7 (Final Draft Report 2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html
253. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) cmt. (2003).
254. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT intro, at 7 (Final Draft Report 2005), available
at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html
(stating that Canon 5 contains
principles that apply to "all judges and judicial candidates" as well as "Rules that separately treat
each of the various types of judicial selection processes").
255.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990).

256. Id. Canon 5(A).
257. Id. Canon 5(B).
258. Id. Canon 5(C).
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elected judges to engage in activities that are expressly forbidden of
"All Judges and Candidates." 2 59 The Final Draft Report retains similar
distinctions, but further subdivides the 'elected judge' category into
26 1
"Partisan Public Elections,"260 "Non-partisan Public Elections,
26 3
62
"Retention Elections," 2 and "Appointive Judicial Office."
The Final Draft Report both lengthens and restructures the list of
prohibited political activities that apply to "All Judges and
Candidates." 2 64 With respect to partisan political activities, the Final
Draft Report declares that judges or candidates cannot publicly identify
themselves as members of or hold any leadership position in a political
organization. 265 Moreover, judges or candidates cannot make speeches
on behalf of, solicit funds for, contribute to, or seek endorsements from
a political organization. 26 6 They cannot publicly endorse or oppose any
candidate for any public office. 2 67 Judges and candidates cannot even
attend or purchase tickets for dinners or other events sponsored by a
political organization. 2 68 With respect to campaign activities, judges
and candidates are prohibited from personally soliciting or accepting
campaign contributions. 269
They may not use any campaign

259. See generally Zeidman, supra note 124, at 719. Zeidman notes the irony that staunch
supporters of merit selection or other appointment methods currently appear to be the most
influential voices in reforming judicial elections. Id. He suggests that this is because merit
selection is not likely to be adopted by any state any time soon. Id. The American Bar
Association is a visible example, maintaining a preference of merit selection but participating in
the debate about judicial election reform. Id.
260. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5.02 (Final Draft Report 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html
261. Id. R. 5.03.
262. Id. R. 5.04.
263. Id.R. 5.05.
264. Id. R. 5.01(A).
265. Id. R. 5.01(A)(1). Because "[p]ublic confidence in the independence and impartiality of
the judiciary is eroded if judges and candidates for judicial office are perceived to be subject to
political influence" judges and candidates "are prohibited.., from assuming a leadership role in a
political organization." Id. R. 5.01 cmt. T 4.
266. Id. R. 5.01(A)(2), (4), (7).
267. Id. R. 5.01(A)(3). The Final Draft Report intends to prohibit judges from "misusing the
prestige of judicial office to advance the interests of others." Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 5. However, this
provision does not prohibit judges or candidates "from privately expressing their views on
candidates for any public office." Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 7.
268. Id. R. 5.01(A)(5). However, candidate for judicial office in partisan public elections may
attend and may purchase tickets to these events, as long as the ticket "does not include a
significant fundraising aspect." Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 9.
269. Id. R. 5.01(A)(8).
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contributions for private benefit,1270 or use court staff, facilities, or other
27
court resources in a campaign.
In light of the White decision and the broad interpretations of its
principles by various courts, the ABA crafted new language restricting
judicial speech. 2 72 The resulting language is very similar to the current
Illinois Code. 27 3 The Final Draft Report permits a judge or candidate to
publicly state or announce his or her views on legal, political, or other
issues. 2 74 In addition, judges and candidates may "engage in political
activity in support of measures that concern the law, the legal system, or
2 75
the administration of justice."
A judge or candidate faces disciplinary action for knowingly or
recklessly making any false or misleading statements or making any
statements that may be expected to affect the outcome or impair the
fairness of pending litigation. 276 The Final Draft Report also retains a
restriction similar to the Illinois Code, stating that a judge "shall not,
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come
before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of
27 7
the office."
The Commentary to the Final Draft Report assures that these
restrictions do not prohibit meaningful campaign speech that provides
voters with information necessary to make informed choices. 27 8 For
example, it is appropriate for a candidate "to make specific campaign
promises with respect to judicial organization, administration, and court

270. Id. R. 5.01(A)(9).
271. Id. R. 5.01(A)(10).
272. Background paper,supra note 140.
273. See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(d) (containing restrictions on the
speech and activity of judges and judicial candidates).
274. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5.01(C)(1) (Final Draft Report 2005), available
at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html.
275. Id. R. 5.01 (C). Permission to engage in activities "concerning the law, the legal system
and the administration of justice" was formerly included in Canon 4 of the Model Code. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(B) (2003). The Commentary suggests that "revision of
substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice" falls into this
category. Id. Canon 4(B) cmt.
276. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5.01(A)(12) (Final Draft Report 2005)
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html. "A candidate, or a
campaign committee on behalf of a candidate, must not make statements that are false or
misleading, or that omit a fact necessary to make the communication considered as a whole not
materially misleading." Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 10.
277. Id. R. 5.01(A)(13).
278. Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 1 16.
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management." 2 79 This could include promises to reduce the backlog of
cases, start court sessions on time, and avoid favoritism in hiring and
280
appointment.
The Commentary reflects the Court's opinion in White by reaffirming
that there is a compelling state interest in judicial impartiality and
incorporating all three definitions set forth by Justice Scalia. 2 8 1 The

Commentary defines impartiality as "keep[ing] an open mind with
respect to issues that may come before [a judge]"
judge must not make promises or commitments
case or class of cases" or with respect to "specific
litigants." 2 82 The Commentary also reflects the

and also states that a
with respect to "any
litigants or classes of
ABA's opposition to

broad interpretations of White, asserting, "Campaigns for judicial283office
must be conducted differently from campaigns for other offices."
III. DISCUSSION

In the wake of these federal cases, Illinois and other states were
forced to examine their ethical rules to determine whether substantive
284
limits on judicial activity comply with the First Amendment.
Various federal courts questioned whether the difference between an

"announce" clause and a "commit" clause, when faithfully enforced, is

substantive or merely semantic. 2 85 This Part evaluates the substance of
the Illinois Code by assessing its success in protecting public

confidence in judicial impartiality and independence. 286 First, this Part
279. Id.
280. Id. It could also include a "pledge to take action outside the courtroom, such as working
toward an improved jury selection system, or lobbying for more funds to improve the physical
plant and amenities of the courthouse." Id.
281. Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 14.
282. Id.
283. Id. R. 5.01 cmt. 15. The Commentary further states, "Citizens have a due process right
to judges who will make decisions based on the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the
parties, regardless of the personal views of the judge." Id.
284. See Gray, supra note 194 at 163-64 (describing activity in the states in the area of
judicial ethics after White).
285. See N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039-42 (D.N.D. 2005)
(finding that there is no real distinction between announcing one's views on issues and making
statements that commit or appear to commit a candidate with respect to those issues). Contra
Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 696 (E.D. Ky. (2004)
(emphasis in original) (finding that "[i]t is an entirely different matter for a judicial candidate to
announce a view on a legal matter than it is for him to promise or commit to rule in a certain
way.....[T]he promises clause and the commits clause do not suffer from the same
underinclusiveness problem as the announce clause, to the extent that they apply to prohibitions
against promises to rule a certain way on issues likely to come before the court.").
286. See infra Part III.B (gathering evidence of the public's perception of the Illinois
judiciary).

2007]

The First Amendment in Judicial Elections

recounts the controversy surrounding the 2004 Illinois Supreme Court

race, widely viewed as one of the most expensive judicial campaign
battles in history. 2 87 Next, this Part examines the public's perception of

the Illinois judiciary by reviewing various survey
data about Illinois
288
voters and other media coverage of the judiciary.
A. The 2004 Illinois Supreme Court Race

The suspicion that unlimited campaign contributions tarnish the
integrity of the courts came to the fore recently in a scandal involving
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier. The 2004 Illinois
Supreme Court race between Justice Karmeier and his opponent,
Gordon Maag, is touted as one of the most expensive judicial elections
in United States history. 289 Karmeier and Maag were running in the
fifth district, located in Madison County, known as "a popular venue for
class-action lawsuits around the country" 290 and a nationally ranked
"Judicial Hellhole." 29 1 Justice Karmeier won the seat after a campaign
in which each candidate raised over $4 million and participated in a
flurry of negative advertising over the issue of tort reform. 29 2 Many
viewed the race as a symbol of the battle over court reform that
traditionally aligns Democrats with trial lawyers and Republicans with
29 3
business interests.

287. See infra Part lI.A (recounting the controversy surrounding the 2004 Illinois Supreme
Court race).
288. See infra Part Ifl.B (reviewing statistical evidence about Illinois voters and media
coverage of the judiciary).
289. Edward D. Mumane, Legal Reform Inches Along in Illinois, 21 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER
(Wash., D.C.), Sept. 22, 2006 ("Never had a judicial election of any level in the United States
generated so much money."); Charles Sheehan, Groups Urge Inquiry into High Court Justice;
State Jurist Rules in Cases of Donors, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2006, Metro, at 6 ("It was the most
expensive judicial race in state history."); Jim Muir, Maag Lawyer Says Defamation Lawsuit
Goes Beyond Court Race, THE SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Dec. 22, 2004 ("the most expensive
judicial race in the nation's history"). Others contend that the distinction belongs to the 1994
Texas Supreme Court race, described as an all-out battle between plaintiff trial lawyers and civil
defense lawyers. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 126 at 915-16.
290. Brian Mackey, Campaign Funding Raises Questions, ST. JOURNAL-REGISTER
(Springfield, Ill.), Feb. 11, 2005, at 13.
291. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005 7 (2005), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/ hellholes [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES] (ranking Madison
County fifth in the nation).
292. Christi Parsons, Judge Sues Over His Failed Campaigning; Maag Says Critics Lied in
Ads, Fliers on His Decisions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2004, Metro, at 1.
293. See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 289, Metro at 6, stating, "The campaign was viewed
nationally as a symbol of the battle over tort reform that has pitted traditionally Democraticaligned trial lawyers against Republican-friendly business interests." Id.

868

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 38

Following his election to the Court, Justice Karmeier participated in
the review of two class-action cases, Avery v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance2 94 and Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.,295 despite his

having accepted thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from
litigants and interest groups that filed amicus briefs with the court in
those cases. 296 Allegedly, lawyers in Avery asked Justice Karmeier to
recuse himself, but he refused and later cast the deciding vote favoring
the donors' interests. 29 7 Justice Karmeier was named in a misconduct
complaint filed with the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board in 2006,298
which asserted that State Farm employees contributed to Justice
Karmeier's campaign indirectly by giving to JUSTPAC, a political

action committee funded by insurance companies and other lobbies for
damage award caps. 299 State Farm denied that it had any direct ties to
Karmeier's campaign fund. 30 0
Nonetheless, many saw Justice
Karmeier's action as a favor to "big business" and a violation of the
judge's duty to recuse himself where his impartiality might reasonably
30 1
be questioned.

294. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 1l.2d 100, (2005) (overturning a $1.05
billion dollar verdict). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Avery v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 126 S.Ct. 1470 (2006).
295. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182 (2005) (dismissing a $10.1 million dollar
judgment). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of the case. Price v. Philip Morris
Inc., 127 S.Ct. 685 (2006).
296. Mackey, supra note 290 (reporting the allegations that the organizations contributed at
least $830,000 to the court race without disclosing the source of the money); Editorial, Ethics?
Ethics? Now Where Did We Put Those.... ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar, 11, 2006, at A45
[hereinafter Ethics Editorial] (reporting the allegation that State Farm contributed over $350,000
to Justice Karmeier's campaign).
297. Mackey, supra note 290 (reporting the allegation that Karmeier refused to recuse himself
on the plaintiffs' request).
298. Illinois Supreme Court Justice Karmeier Named in Misconduct Complaint Over $2.5
Million Accepted in Donations from Defendants and Their Amici in Pending Cases Involving
State Farm and Philip Morris USA, PR NEWSWIRE US, Feb. 7, 2006 (reporting the allegations of
the complaint); Illinois Judge in Possible Investigation, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Feb. 7, 2006;
Groups Ask State Board to Investigate Karmeier, BELLEVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT (111.) Feb. 8,
2006.
299. Sheehan, supra note 289, Metro at 6 (reporting that the Illinois Civil Justice League,
which runs JUSTPAC, contributed $1.2 million to Karmeier's campaign).
300. Scott Miller, State Farm: No Favors Bought, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Feb. 9,
2006, at Cl. State Farm contended, "The key issue is that State Farm has a long-standing policy
that we don't [sic] contribute to political campaigns. We don't [sic] have a political action
committee." Id.
301. Stephanie Potter, Money Taints Judiciary, Panel Warns, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Feb.
13, 2006, at 1; Ethics Editorial, supra note 296, at A45 ("A judge who takes $350,000 in
contributions and then rules in his donor's favor leaves himself wide open to questions about
conflict of interest."); A Better Way to Choose Judges, BELLEVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT (111.), Aug.
8, 2006 (asking, "How many costly, ugly judicial races will it take to force this change [to merit
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In an ironic development, the losing candidate in the expensive 2004

Supreme Court race, Gordon Maag, filed a defamation suit in Madison
County claiming that a campaign flyer funded by the Illinois Coalition
for Jobs, Growth, and Prosperity contained lies about his record.3°2 The
disputed flier stated that the "'Wheels of Justice' have ground to a
screeching halt" because of Gordon Maag's "embarrassing-and
' 30 4
30 3
It listed six "questionable decisions,
dangerous" record on crime.

only one of which was authored by then-Appellate Court Justice
Maag, 30 5 accusing him of reducing criminal sentences when in fact a
three judge panel ordered new trials. 30 6 Maag alleged that the purpose
of the negative campaigning was not only to defeat him in the Supreme
Court race, but was "a deliberate effort to kick him from the bench. 30 7
Maag lost the concurrent retention election for his seat on the Illinois
Appellate Court. 30 8 The suit was dismissed in the circuit court on a
finding that the flier did not constitute defamation since it criticized his

selection]?"). The Illinois State Election Board is investigating the Illinois Coalition for Jobs,
Growth and Prosperity and Justice for All Foundation, two organizations that allegedly failed to
comply with campaign disclosure laws regarding donations to the 2004 election candidates.
Mackey, supra note 290, at 13.
302. Muir, supra note 289. The Illinois Chamber of Commerce was also named as a
defendant on the basis of its actions supporting Karmeier during the election. Id.
Karmeier is not the most recent judge to have instituted a defamation suit against a member of the
media. In 2006, the phrase "a little political shimmy shammy" prompted Illinois Supreme Court
Justice Robert Thomas to institute a successful defamation suit against columnist Bill Page, who
criticized Justice Thomas' handling of a disciplinary proceeding involving State's Attorney Meg
Gorecki. Christi Parsons, Chief Justice Doesn't Just Get Mad, He Sues, CHI. TRIB., June 18,
2006, at 1. Gorecki was sentenced to a four month suspension of her law license after being
accused of leaving messages on an answering machine suggesting that a political contribution
would help a job applicant secure a position. Id. Page wrote that Justice Thomas was not
impartial with respect to Gorecki-that he had originally pushed for a tougher sentence but
agreed to the lesser sentence to gain the support of individuals connected to Gorecki for a judicial
candidate he favored. Id. Justice Thomas vigorously protested Page's assertions. Id. In
November of 2006, a Kane County jury awarded Thomas $7 million. Abdon M. Pallasch, Libel
Suit Appeal Could Be Tricky: Colleagues of Thomas May Have to Hear His Case, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at 44. The $7 million represents an estimate of Thomas' future earnings,
which he alleged would be hindered or eliminated by the defamatory columns. Tona Kunz, War
of Words, A Libel Trial Between the Chief Justice of Illinois' Supreme Court and a Columnist
Comes Down to Who Can Say the Least, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 22, 2006 at 1.
303. ILL. COAL. FOR JOBS, GROWTH AND PROSPERITY, CAMPAIGN FLIER, GORDON MAAG'S
RECORD ON THE BENCH, (on file with author). To read the text of the campaign flier, see Maag
App. Ct. 2006).
Coal. For Jobs, Growth and Prosperity, 858 N.E.2d. 967, 970-71 (Ill.
v. I1.
304. Maag, 858 N.E.2d. at 970.
305. Muir, supra note 289.
306. Maag, 858 N.E.2d at 975; Daniel C. Vock, Maag Sues Groups For Defamation, CH.
DAILY LAW BULL., Dec. 21, 2004, at 1.
307. Muir, supra note 289.
308. Id.; Vock, supra note 306, at 1.
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record, but did not malign Maag personally. 30 9 Maag appealed the
dismissal in the Fifth District, which affirmed the decision of the trial

court. 310 Many members of the media noted the irony of a civil suit of
this nature, stemming from alleged wrongs committed during a
campaign that had focused on the number and kind of lawsuits filed in
Illinois. 311 Some speculated that the 2004 campaign, dramatically
culminating in Maag's defamation suit, could only serve to3 12further
damage the public's perception of the judicial selection process.
B. Public Trust and Confidence in the Illinois Judiciary
Although it is difficult to evaluate whether political campaigning in

judicial elections like the 2004 Supreme Court race, or similar
occurrences, actually harm the public's confidence in the judiciary,
survey data about Illinois voters' perception of the judiciary may be

illustrative.

313

The National Center for State Courts conducted a survey in 1999
measuring the public's confidence in the courts. 3 1 4 The survey's
findings generally suggested that the public's perception of the courts is
not good. 3 15 Although about 80% of respondents agreed that "judges

309. Maag, 858 N.E.2d at 971; Defeated Candidate Loses Fight Over Campaign Flier, CHI.
TRIB., June 12, 2005, at Metro, at 3.
310. Maag v. I1.Coal. For Jobs, Growth and Prosperity, 858 N.E.2d 967, 976 (111.App. Ct.
2006). The Court stated that the "hysterical hyperbole in the flyer is insulting to the judicial and
electoral process... .The flyer is the product of a mindset that believes voter manipulation can be
accomplished by resort to phrases that evoke emotion rather than thought." Id. at 973.
Nonetheless, the Court found that such "mean-spirited" statements do not necessarily constitute
defamation. Id.
311. Muir, supra note 289; Parsons, supra note 292, Metro, at 1 (quoting Ed Murnane,
president of the Illinois Civil Justice League, an advocacy group for tort reform that supported
Karmeier, "Following an election in which the abuse of the court system clearly was an issue in
the minds of many voters, a losing candidate.. resorts to a ridiculous lawsuit.").
312. See, e.g., Stephanie Potter, Money Taints Judiciary, Panel Warns, 152 CHI. DAILY LAW
BULLETIN, Feb. 13, 2006 (reporting one state senator's comment that "he increasingly worries
about the public perception that judges are swayed by special interest groups"); Sheehan, supra
note 289, Metro, at 6 (reporting that "there is increasing unease about money being pumped into
judicial campaigns and the influence that may have on the court"); Ethics Editorial,supra note
296, at A45 ("Judges smiling down from the bench at their campaign contributors mock the
public's confidence in even-handed justice.").
313. See infra Part III.B.
314. 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 27; see David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins,
Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36
COURT REVIEW 24 (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCSurveysMeanToJudgesPub.pdf (presenting a detailed summary of the survey's
findings).
315. Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 314, at 27.
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are generally honest and fair in deciding cases" 3 16 and 85% agreed that
"courts protect defendants' constitutional rights," the level of trust and
confidence in the courts was low compared to other public
institutions. 3 17 For example, the "Courts in Your Community" ranked
sixth out of eight institutions examined. 3 18 The survey suggested that a
possible basis for this discrepancy is the perception that politics
influence judicial decisions. 3 19 Approximately 80% of the respondents
agreed that "judges' decisions are influenced by political
considerations." 3 20 They also agreed that "elected judges are influenced
by having to raise campaign funds." 32 1 A 2001 national survey found
that eight out of ten registered voters believe that campaign
contributions to judges have a great deal or some influence on judges'
322
decisions.
This statistic is reflected among Illinois voters. A 2002 survey by the
Illinois Campaign for Political Reform reported that more than 85% of
voters believed that campaign contributions influence judicial
decisions. 323 Another 2001 survey found that 72% of Illinois judges
believed that the tone and conduct of judicial campaigns had gotten
3 24
worse over the preceding five years.
These findings are paired with reports that voters know very little
about the judicial selection process. 32 5 A survey by the Chicago Bar
Association revealed that a substantial majority of Illinois voters lack
knowledge regarding judicial candidates or even the rules of judicial
elections. 3 26 Fewer than 20% of voters surveyed said they have "a great
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
42.

1999 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 27, at 30.
Id. at 32.
Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 314, at 28.
Id.
Id.; 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 27, at 41.
Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 314, at 28; 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 27, at

322. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 59 (expanded ed. 2002) available at

http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/CallToActionCommentary.pdf

[hereinafter

CALL

TO

ACTION].

323. ILL. CAMPAIGN FOR POLITICAL REFORM, 2002 ILLINOIS STATEWIDE SURVEY ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION ISSUES 7, available at http://www.ilcampaign.org/analysis/reports/2002/
judicialSurvey.pdf.
324. Justice
at
Stake
Campaign,
Learn
About
Your
State:
Illinois,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadCrumb=4,124,81 (last visited March 18,
2007).
325. See infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text (citing a Chicago Bar Association Survey
finding that voters are not well informed about judicial elections).
326. CHI. BAR ASS'N SURVEY, supra note 23. The Chicago Bar Association conducted this
telephone survey of 306 Cook County voters in April 1998 to determine whether they voted in the
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deal of information" about judicial candidates and separately stated that
32 7
most of the information available is considered "highly fallible."
Only 20% of voters said they were "very aware" and only 32%
"somewhat aware" of the qualifications ratings prepared by lawyers'
organizations that screen judicial candidates. 3 28 In any case, many
voters do not trust the ratings: only 13% considered them "very
objective" and 73% said they were "somewhat objective." 3 29 Finally,
only 5% of voters said they are "very satisfied" with the current judicial
selection system in Illinois, while 43% said they are "somewhat
satisfied. '3 30 Notably, satisfaction with Illinois' current system is
highest among those who say that political experience or party
331
affiliation is extremely important in selecting judges.
The Chicago Bar Association survey suggested that Illinois voters
may be open to judicial selection reform. 332 Sixty-three percent of
voters agreed with a proposal for merit selection that stated "[u]nder the
merit system, when a judge position becomes vacant a panel of experts
recommends a list of qualified candidates and one of them is appointed
to the position." 333 Support for merit selection is highest among those
334
with personal or family experiences with the court system.
In further exploration of the relationship between the political arena
and judicial selection, a 2003 study of the judicial election process in
Cook County ("Cook County study") concluded that the link between

1998 Illinois primary and the information they relied upon to cast their votes in the judicial
elections. Id.
327. Id. Although there were no Illinois Supreme Court elections in 1998, only 7% say they
generally have a great deal of information about those campaigns. Id.
328. Id. The survey commented, "It is a bone chilling observation to note that even though
very large numbers who go to the polling booth consider themselves to be nearly, or completely
ignorant about judicial candidates, most people vote for judicial candidates anyway." Id. The
survey found that 40% vote for the candidates but say they have "hardly any information" and 9%
vote with "no information." Id.
329. Id. Even among those who were "very aware" of the existence of the ratings, only 30%
said the rating are "very objective," and 61% said they are "somewhat objective." Id. About
20% of the voters said they rely on the candidates' campaign materials, but the materials were not
perceived as objective. Id.
330. Id. In comparison, 80% or more are usually satisfied with institutions and public services
such as fire protection, garbage collection, or street lighting. Id.
331. Id. For those who emphasize other priorities, such as courtroom demeanor or legal
experience, the level of satisfaction is lower. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. The study found that "agreement with the merit system is significantly related to
dissatisfaction with the current system." Id. Support for the merit selection proposal was highest
among those who are "very dissatisfied" or "somewhat dissatisfied" with the current system, 81%
and 76% respectively. Id.
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judicial campaign financing and the political slating process is
increasingly important. 335 The Cook County study concluded that party
slating is considered the primary determinant of election winners. 3 36 It
also found a high correlation between candidates' contributions to
political parties and their success at the ballot box: in 2000, 83% of
winners of non-retention elections gave money to party
organizations.3 3 7 In contrast, none of the losers contributed money.3 3 8
In Cook County, there are two levels of the judicial system: countywide circuits and smaller "subcircuit districts." 339 County-wide circuit
judges are selected by voters of the whole county, but subcircuit judges
must reside within the geographic boundaries of their subcircuit and are
elected by the voters within those boundaries. 340 According to some,
the creation of the subcircuits changed the environment of judicial
campaign fundraising. 341 The Cook County study found that although
party slating and campaign funding were important in subcircuit
elections, some observers believe that high-quality, unslated candidates
342
could win if they could raise enough funds.
Other organizations, arguably self-interested, conducted surveys that
cast the Illinois judiciary in an unattractive light. For example, Illinois
ranked 45th out of all states in a national survey measuring the
335. Electing Judges in Cook County: The Role of Money, PoliticalParty, and the Voter, THE
CHI.
APPLESEED
FUND
FOR
JUSTICE
15,
Apr.
2003,
available
at
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/projects/judicialreform/ReformProposal.pdf [hereinafter Cook
County Study]. The study noted, however, that the relationship between money and slating could
"take one of two forms: (1) fundraising increases the likelihood of being slated, or (2) slating
increases the potential for fundraising." Id. at 25. In the subcircuits, the causal relationship
between money and slating varied-some candidates raised large funds before being slated. Id.
Others did not, but there was "an understanding that they would be able to provide significant
funding once they were slated." Id.
336. Id. at 16. The study reports the opinion of "one election law expert" that "The
[Democratic] Party presents all of the [Democratic Party slated] candidates together, including
judges, knowing the audience will vote for the slates." Id. at 28.
337. Id. at 26.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 10. The subcircuits were created in 1992 to quell criticisms that county-wide
elections made it too difficult for minorities and Republicans to get elected to the bench. Id. at
I1.
340. Id. at 10. Once elected, both county-wide and subcircuit judges can be assigned to any
division of the Circuit Court and have the same powers. Id.
341. Id. at 11.
342. Id. According to the Cook County study, the small geographic size of the subcircuits
allows candidates to distribute campaign information to every voter with a relatively modest
amount of money. Id. However, in some instances poorly qualified slated candidates beat highly
qualified candidates who could not raise large amounts of campaign funds. Id. Additionally,
uncontrollable factors like ballot position and ethnicity of last name continue to play a role in
voter decision-making, increasing the uncertainty about the role of campaign financing. Id.
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reasonableness and fairness of the court system, according to a study
commissioned by the United States Institute for Legal Reform in
2006.343 On "judicial impartiality" and "judges' competence," Illinois
ranked 45th and 43rd, respectively. 34 4 In the same survey, Cook
County rated "third worst" among cities or counties nationally with "the
least fair and reasonable litigation environments," followed closely by
Madison County. 34 5 By a wide margin, the number one reason given
for this ranking was "biased judgment." 34 6 In a separate national survey
from the American Tort Reform Foundation, Cook, Madison, and St.
Clair counties all appeared on a six-member list of "Judicial Hellholes"
347 The results of these surveys were widely
around the entire country.
34 8
reported in the media.
An assessment of judicial bias by third-party interest groups, which
frequently have their own agenda, may not be unimpeachable, in that
such groups may depict the judiciary in a particular fashion suitable to
their interest. 34 9 However, even if the survey results are driven by
inaccurate perceptions, perceptions matter; perceptions can influence
behavior. 350 Furthermore, if the public has a view of the courts that
inaccurately reflects the judiciary's performance, it does no good to
35 1
pretend those views do not exist.
IV. ANALYSIS

Most judges in Illinois are intelligent, qualified, and ethical; it is not
the purpose of this Comment to suggest otherwise. Furthermore, this
Comment does not mean to suggest that Illinois' current method of
judicial selection results in more instances of judicial misconduct.
Rather, it suggests that survey data and the critical tone of media
coverage of the Illinois judiciary 3 52 support the assertion that the
campaign tactics and political interests that control Illinois judicial
343.

STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY, supra

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. at 4.

note 24, at 1.

Id. at 12.

Id.
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note

291, at 7.

See, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, Biz Lawyers Blast Illinois Court Systems, CHI. DAILY LAW
BULLETIN, Mar. 30, 2006; Libby Sander, Trial Lawyers, Judges Bristle at Biz Groups'
Allegations, 29 CHI. LAWYER, June 2006. (reporting the survey data).

349. Cf Carrington, supra note 58, at 107 (discussing the effect of modem journalism on
public cynicism).

350. Rottman & Tomkins, supra note 314, at 31.
351.
352.

Id.
Supra Part I.B (summarizing survey data that indicates problems with the public's

perception of the Illinois judiciary).
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elections threaten the appearance of impartiality. 35 3 In so doing, they
threaten to further erode the public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. 35 4 In this climate, the Illinois Code cannot safeguard the
judiciary against the threats to judicial independence posed by the
combination of free speech and money flowing in from opposing
355
interest groups.
This Part contends that the state of First Amendment jurisprudence,
holding restrictions on judicial speech unconstitutional, further weakens
the fragile case for judicial elections. 3 56
Without meaningful
restrictions on judicial speech and conduct, campaigns for judicial
office will resemble those for executive or legislative office. 357 This is
not what the drafters of the 1848 Illinois Constitution hoped to
accomplish by instituting the elected judiciary. 35 8 This Part considers
proposed intermediate methods of reforming judicial elections, such as
public financing of judicial campaigns, amending ethical rules, and
relying on disqualification to ensure judicial impartiality. 35 9
It
concludes that these intermediate reforms are inadequate responses to
360
the problems facing the Illinois judiciary.
A. According Broad FirstAmendment Freedoms to JudicialSpeech
UnderminesArguments in Support of Judicial Elections
Current First Amendment jurisprudence further weakens the case for
judicial elections. First, it is no longer reasonable to rely on ethical
restrictions to regulate inappropriate judicial activity. 36 1 Second, the
perceived influence of third-party interests in judicial elections poses a

353. See Cook County Study, supra note 335 (discussing the importance of campaign funds
and slating in achieving success in a Cook County judicial election).
354. See De Muniz, supra note 3, at 764 (noting the debate regarding whether special interest
financing of judicial elections threatens judicial impartiality).
355. Cf Weiser, supra note 4, at 666 (arguing that the United States Supreme Court's failure
to accord deference to the state's interest in judicial independence has left a "gaping hole" in the

constitutionality of ethical canons).
356. See infra Part IV.A (rejecting arguments in support of judicial elections in light of the
unconstitutionality of speech restrictions).
357. See infra notes 382-91 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for judicial
campaigns to become like other political campaigns).
358. See supra Part lI.A.1 (discussing the political situation prior to the institution of the

elected judiciary, where the judiciary was completely dependent on the appointment power of the
General Assembly).
359. See infra Part V.A. 1, 2, and 3 (considering and rejecting intermediate proposals for the

reform of judicial elections).
360. Id.
361.

See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the impractical nature of judicial speech restrictions).
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threat to the public's confidence in the judiciary. 362 Third, in the
resulting climate, Illinois' interest in judicial independence far
outweighs the asserted interest in judicial accountability to the
36 3
public.
1. The Ineffectiveness of Speech Restrictions
Some interpretations of the Illinois Code illustrate that it can be
reasonable and fairly applied, at least with respect to extra-judicial
activities and appointments. 364 However, advisory ethics opinions
regarding permissible judicial speech illustrate the limited utility of the
Illinois Code in resolving the conflict caused by federal rulings on the
First Amendment rights of candidates and judges. 365 Neither the
Illinois Code nor advisory opinions interpreting it effectively
circumscribe the limits of acceptable speech.3 6 6 According to some
interpretations, it appears that a judge may speak in almost any forum,

on and off the campaign trail, on any conceivable issue, as long as she
"takes pains" to ensure that nothing she says casts doubt on her ability

362. See infra Part [V.A.2 (describing the impact of third-party interests on judicial elections).
363. See infra Part IV.A.3 (arguing that Illinois' interest in judicial independence outweighs
the desire for judicial accountability to the public).
364. Advisory opinions of the Illinois Judicial Elections Committee and the Illinois Judges'
Association demonstrate such reasonable application. Interpreting the rule requiring a candidate
to maintain the dignity of judicial office, ILL. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(a), the
Committee found that it is permissible and laudable for a judge to participate in civics functions,
such as a children's parade. Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-3, 1994 WL 808084 (Jan. 19,
1994). Similarly, a judge may sponsor a little league team and have the judge's name on the team
uniforms, without lessening public confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary. Ill.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 00-3, 2000 WL 776884 (Apr. 18, 2000). However, a judge engages
in inappropriate and misleading political campaigning when he or she uses "Judge" in campaign
advertising in a way that would make people think he or she already was a judge. Ill. Judges'
Ass'n, Op. No. 98-3 (Apr. 8, 1998), availableat http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/98-03.htm
(interpreting ILL. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(ii), which provides that a
candidate for judicial office shall not "knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present
position or other fact concerning the candidate").
With respect to extrajudicial appointments, the Judicial Ethics Committee correctly found that a
judge should not serve on an alderman's advisory committee, where the judge will be asked to
advise on an indefinite topical basis regarding matters which the alderman or others might present
to the City Council. Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-14, 1996 WL 407843 (Jul. 16, 1996).
Neither may a candidate for judgeship serve as a deputy voter registrar; such patently political
activity would violate the Illinois Code, the Election Code, and the Illinois Constitution. Ill.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 98-16, 1998 WL 796070 (Nov. 10, 1998).
365. See infra notes 366-77 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of defining limits of
acceptable speech).
366. See Swanson, supra note 11, at 105 (supporting the abandonment of speech restrictions
because of the difficulty of enforcing them, since it is "impossible for a candidate to know when
his political speech crossed the boundary between permissible and impermissible.")
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to decide issues impartially.3 6 7 It is difficult, however, to articulate
what "taking pains" entails. 36 8 Although writing a disclaimer on a
scholarly article is sufficient, for example, it is not clear whether and
369
what other actions might be sufficiently painstaking.
For example, the Illinois Code permits a judge to speak, write, or
lecture about any topic concerning "the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice," 370 but forbids him to say anything that may
367. The Illinois Code states that a judge or a candidate may engage in "law related activities"
such as speaking, writing, lecturing, or teaching on topics "concerning the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice," provided the judge "does not cast doubt on his or her capacity
to decide impartially any issue that may come before [the judge]." ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 4(A); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 64(A). Consistent with this principle, the Committee
ruled that a judge, then a candidate for a higher judicial office, may publish an essay in a local
newspaper about crime and "the gun problem." Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-5, 1994 WL
808086 (Mar. 22, 1994). The essay advocated strict gun control, but contained a disclaimer that
..as a member of the judiciary the author is committed to remain impartial with regard to any issue
before him as a judge." Id. Under Buckley, gun control may be considered a "general topic"
concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. Id. Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(i),
amended in accordance with Buckley, states that a candidate cannot make "statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues within
cases that are likely to come before the court." ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(A)(3)(d)(i)(2006). In finding the Illinois Code's "announce clause" unconstitutional, the
Buckley court noted that it unconstitutionally prohibited judges or candidates from discussing
topics such as "substantive due process, economic rights, search and seizure, the war on drugs,
and the use of excessive force by police, the conditions of prisons, or products liability-or for
that matter about laissez-faire economics, race relations, the civil war in Yugoslavia, or the proper
direction of health-care reform.'" Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir.
1993). The Commission opined that gun control fits within this list because it is a "general issue
of public concern," but not the type of issue that would commit the judge to rule a particular way.
ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-5, 1994 WL 808086 (Mar. 22, 1994)
In another opinion, the Committee found that judges may create a "Speakers' Bureau" and
inform the public of their availability to speak on issues regarding "the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice." 111.Judicial Ethics. Comm. Op. 94-17, 1994 WL 808097 (June 17,
1994). When asked whether specific issues were acceptable for discussion, the Committee
opined that judges may speak about abortion, the death penalty, sentencing issues, the
competence (or lack thereof) of lawyers generally, the activities and positions of the organized
bar, the merit of proposed legislation, and local government issues, like bond issues and tax
referendums, jail overcrowding, and plea bargaining. Id.
There are also apparently few limits regarding the acceptable forum for judicial speech. A
judge may be a featured speaker at the dinner of a political party, held after election day, provided
that the event is a community gathering, not a political fundraiser, and provided that the speech
does not compromise the judge's independence and integrity. Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 9619, 1996 WL 557296 (Sept. 16, 1996). The "nature" of the dinner determines whether the judge
is speaking on behalf of the political system or on behalf of a political party, the former only
constituting acceptable speech. Id.
368. See Swanson, supra note 11, at 105 (noting that enforcement of the announce clause is
unworkable).
369. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-5, 1994 WL 808086 (Mar. 22, 1994) (a judge's
disclaimer on a scholarly article about gun control was at least partly sufficient to avoid an ethical
violation).
370. See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (A), ILL. SUP. CT. R 64 (A) (2006)
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cast doubt on his ability to make impartial judgments. 37 1 Advisory
opinions interpreting this rule understandably contain little guidance as
to what constitutes permissible speech since virtually all legal and
372
political issues can be discussed in a manner that suggests partiality.
The death penalty, for example, is precisely the sort of divisive, political

issue that a judge should not discuss in a manner suggesting he has
already determined how he will rule in a particular case. 37 3 That being
the case, how is a reasonable judge to know what speech casts doubt on
37 4
his ability to judge impartially?
At the same time, speech restrictions do not prevent judges and

candidates from signaling their opinions on prohibited issues to
voters. 375 There are a variety of ways candidates can make implied

commitments, such as slogans in campaign literature, statements about
opponents, emphasis on certain aspects of the candidate's law
experience or judicial records, and, of course, endorsements. 376 The

2004 Illinois Supreme Court race illustrates the way judicial campaigns
can be highly issue-oriented without explicitly violating the Illinois
Code.

37 7

Some proponents of judicial elections applaud public speech that lets
voters learn about judges' predilections, arguing that there is no such
thing as an impartial judge, a tabula rasa, and that voters in a
democracy should have freedom to choose judges based on policy
considerations. 378 This argument misconstrues the function of the
(providing that judges may speak, write, lecture, and teach, provided they do not cast doubt on
their ability to decide issues impartially); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-17, 1994 WL 808097
(June 17, 1994) (judges may form a Speakers' Bureau and be available to address audiences on
topics concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice).
371.

ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2006).

372. "Almost anything a judicial candidate might say about 'improv[ing] the law' could be
taken to cast doubt on his capacity to decide some case impartially, unless he confined himself to
the most mundane and technical proposals for law reform." Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd.,
997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).
373. Id.
374. Swanson, supra note 11, at 105; see Spargo v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 72, 81-82 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding provisions of the New York Judicial Code of
Conduct vague and lacking specificity).
375. Minzner, supra note 19, at 210.
376. Id. at 215-27 (discussing the ways these methods can and have been used to send
messages to voters about specific issues that are prohibited by the judicial code).
377. See supra Part IIl.A (recounting the 2004 Illinois Supreme Court race, which pitted
business interests against the plaintiffs' bar in an expensive, highly politicized campaign).
378. See Dimino, supra note 87, at 344-45 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., memorandum opinion)) ("Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.").
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judiciary. 37 9 When judges have unlimited freedom to discuss divisive
issues in a manner implying their intention to rule a certain way, the
judiciary appears like a representative branch, where candidates and
judges are sought or avoided on the basis of their opinions on policy
matters. 380 This is undesirable because unlike a legislative or executive
branch, the judiciary functions as an independent body applying
democratically
enacted law to facts, regardless of the desires of
381
voters.
The decisional trend in state and federal courts appears directed at
382
broadening, not limiting, elected judges' First Amendment freedoms.
Judges and judicial candidates currently enjoy the constitutional right to
announce their views on disputed legal and political issues.38 3 Guided
by the Court's decision in White, various state courts and federal courts
of appeals found other restrictions on judicial speech unconstitutional,
including restrictions prohibiting judges from making "pledges or
promises" or "commitments" to rule a particular way, and prohibitions
against making misrepresentations about an opponent. 3 84 It is not
patently unreasonable to doubt the practical difference between the
"announce" and "commit" clause, since both appear to be drafted with
the same intent. 3 85 Critics of this trend, however, argue that such an
expansive reading of White unjustifiably disregards the state's interest
3 86
in promoting judicial integrity, impartiality, and independence.

379. See White, supra note 15, at 1061 (arguing that accountability to voters conflicts with
"the essence of our tripartite system of government.").
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5.01, cmt. 15 (Final Draft Report
2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html ("the judicial role is
different from the role of legislative or executive branch officials."); Thomas Address, supra note
112, at 2 ("It is th[e] ability to render judgment without concern for anything but the law that
should distinguish judges from members of the legislature or the executive branch.").
382. See De Muniz, supra note 3, at 764 (arguing that White will likely lead to the elimination
of most state judicial campaign speech regulations).
383. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
384. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Spargo v. State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek.
345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct
Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004); N. D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021
(D.N.D. 2005).
385. See Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-42, (finding that there is no real distinction between
announcing one's views on issues and making statements that commit or appear to commit a
candidate with respect to those issues).
386. Gray, The Limits of White, supra note 195, at 315; see Weiser, supra note 4 (contending
that the Supreme Court's decision in White failed to take into account the compelling state
interest in judicial independence).
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The implications of the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Weaver, finding

Georgia's "misrepresent" clause unconstitutional, resonates in Illinois
where campaign tactics like those used against Gordon Maag are not
uncommon. 387 The Weaver court found that Georgia's "misrepresent

clause" did not afford enough "breathing space" to judicial speech by
prohibiting misleading statements and material misrepresentations of
fact or law. 388 The Illinois Code contains similar restrictions, providing
that a judge or candidate may not "knowingly misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning [a] candidate or
an opponent." 3 89 Maag alleged in his defamation suit that statements
about his record in a campaign flier fit this category. 390 If White really

eliminates the barriers to nasty campaign tactics prohibited by the
"misrepresent" clause, the line between judicial elections and elections
391
for executive and legislative office will be virtually invisible.

2. Third-Party Influence
Even more disturbing than the application of Illinois' "misrepresent"
clause to Maag's defamation suit is that the campaign flier at issue was
not challenged as a violation of the clause because it applies to judges,
not third-party interest groups. 392 Judicial candidates hardly need First
Amendment freedoms to besmirch an opponent's reputation during a
campaign when supportive third parties with resources are willing to
exercise their free speech to that end instead.39 3
387. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
2004,
10,
17,
18-19
(2004),
available
at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf
[hereinafter
GOLDBERG]
(describing other campaign ads used in the 2004 Illinois Supreme Court race, such as an ad
criticizing Justice Karmeier because he "gave probation to kidnappers who tortured and nearly
beat a 92-year-old grandmother to death;" an ad criticizing Gordon Maag for voting to "overturn
the conviction of a man who sexually assaulted a 6-year-old-girl"; a television commercial
blaming "bad judges" and "their trial lawyer friends" for various societal problems; a television
commercial accusing Justice Karmeier of "tak[ing] money from the asbestos industry which is
responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths..
. How can he be on our side if the big
corporate interests are on his side?").
388. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319.
389. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(ii); SUP. CT. RULE 67(A)(3)(d)(ii)
(West 2006).
390. See supra, notes 302-11 and accompanying text (recounting Maag's allegations that the
statements in the campaign flier were lies and distorted his record).
391. See Renata Olafson Seizer, The Future of Judicial Elections in North Dakota, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 197, 203-04 (2006) (discussing the potential for judicial elections to become "full-blown
political campaigns"); Weiser, supra note 4, at 654 (stating that confusion about ethical standards
for judges comes at a time when judicial elections look more and more like elections for political
office).
392. ILL. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(ii) (West 2006).
393. See De Muniz, supra note 3, at 764 (noting the debate regarding whether special interest
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The influence of money from third-party interest groups in judicial
races works current, not prospective, institutional damage on the
judiciary. 394 When judicial campaigns are a battleground for opposing
political interests, such as occurred in the war over court reforms in the
2004 Illinois Supreme Court race, the public will stop trusting the
39 5
impartiality of judges who campaign on behalf of those interests.

Regardless of whether judges are actually beholden to their
contributors, the public will perceive that they are. 39 6 A 2001 national
survey found that eight out of ten registered voters believe that
campaign contributions to judges have a great deal of or some influence
on judges' decisions. 39 7
Noting this statistic, one commentator
surmised that the number will surely rise as post-White judicial
campaigns combine the rhetoric of special interest groups and speeches
by judicial candidates promising certain outcomes with personal
39 8
solicitations of campaign contributions from lawyers and voters.
Aside from threats to the appearance of impartiality, inappropriate

external pressures may in some instances lead to real judicial
misconduct. 39 9 At the very least, there is a palpable risk that campaign

contributions jeopardize judicial independence by creating the inference
of a judge's financial obligation to decide cases in a manner favorable
to donors' interests. 40 0 Because Illinois judges must stand for reelection every four, six, or ten years,40 1 the shadow of donors' interests
40 2
in the context of the next campaign is always looming.
Combined with an absence of meaningful restrictions on speech, the
escalating cost and politicization of Illinois judicial campaigns creates a
financing of judicial elections threatens judicial impartiality).
394. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 126, at 938 (arguing that, "Texas' expensive judicial
races exemplify the deep institutional damage that can result from money's influence").
395. Id. at 939; De Muniz, supra note 3, at 768. See also Carlton, supra note 110, at 846
("Thus, the 'invisible elephant in the parlor' is money and judicial campaigns. There is nothing
so corrosive to the public confidence in the judicial system than the growing amounts of money
that are being pumped into judicial races, and the resulting rising tide of judicial politicization.").
396. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text (discussing the results of voter surveys
suggesting that most voters believe judges are influence by campaign contributions); Carrington,
supra note 58, at 112-13 ("What is a litigant
to think of the disinterestedness and openmindedness of a court whose members were financed by his or her adversaries?
[1It asks
entirely too much of citizens to expect them to believe that there is no connection between who
wins and who pays.").
397. CALL TO ACTION, supra note 322, at 59.
398. De Muniz, supra note 3, at 768.
399. Champagne & Cheek, supra note 126, at 939 ("In extreme cases, the new judicial politics
may result not just in the appearance of impropriety, but in real judicial misconduct.").
400. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1009.
401. ILL. CONST. art. VI § 10.
402. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1010.
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climate threatening to the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. 40 3 Due to federal decisions allowing candidates to state their
views on controversial issues, limitless campaign expenditures, and
candidates who are slated by political parties, Illinois judicial elections
are increasingly difficult to distinguish from campaigns for legislative
4 04
or executive office.
3. The Compelling Interest in Judicial Independence
One standard counterargument to the rhetoric about judicial
independence is that the risks to that independence posed by judicial
elections are acceptable to ensure judicial accountability to the
public. 40 5 This argument rests partly on the flawed assumption that the
elected judiciary was instituted to give the majority democratic power
over judicial decisions. 40 6 On the contrary, the movement towards
judicial elections stemmed from the negative effects of the legislature's
complete power to appoint judges, which subjected the judicial
selection process to disruptive political battles. 40 7 Nonetheless, the
judicial accountability argument may have been persuasive when the
states' interest in ensuring judicial independence and impartiality could
partially be addressed by meaningful regulations on campaign speech
and activities. 40 8 After White, the state's purview over judicial elections
seems to be shrinking in size to match its limited dominion over
40 9
legislative and executive elections.
403. CALL TO ACTION, supra note 322, at 7; see Seizer, supra note 391 (discussing the
changing climate of judicial campaigns).
404. See Selzer, supra note 391, at 203-04 (discussing the potential for judicial elections to
become "full-blown political campaigns").
405. See supra Part II.A.2 (presenting the arguments in favor of judicial elections).
406. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (describing the history of judicial
selection in Illinois).
407. Id. Critics of alternate judicial selection methods validly respond to this point by noting
that appointive systems or merit selection cannot eliminate political influence from the judicial
selection process. Dimino, supra note 87, at 348; see generally RICHARD A.WATSON & RONDAL
G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1969) (one of the first and most
comprehensive studies of the merit selection system, finding that merit selection does not entirely
eliminate political forces from judicial selection, but also reporting many positive consequences).
Although politics cannot be completely eliminated, in the sense that an appointing committee or
other body will likely be responsive to political pressures, the most corrosive effects of judicial
election campaigning can be minimized. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status,
Procedures,and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 78 (1994) (arguing that although politics has not
been eliminated under the merit plan in various states, it has been greatly minimized).
408. Cf. Weiser, supra note 4, at 664-67 (arguing for deference to restrictions on judicial
activity as necessary to serve a compelling state interest).
409. See Braynen v. State of Fla., 895 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J.,
concurring) (opining that "judicial elections can no longer be distinguished on any serious basis
from elections of other candidates to office.").
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In this new atmosphere, the risks to judicial independence outweigh
any perceived interest in judicial accountability. 4 10 This is particularly
true considering the evidence that Illinois judges are not meaningfully
accountable to voters; in reality, they are accountable to political party
leaders. 4 11
Moreover, there is significant data supporting the
proposition that voters are apathetic about judicial elections, and rarely
vote. 4 12 When they do, they vote based on limited knowledge that they
consider unreliable or based on factors like party identification and
ethnicity of last name. 4 13 Furthermore, judicial candidates cannot get
on the ballot or hope to win without the political and monetary support
of party leaders. 4 14 In this context, exercise of the voting franchise does
not bring judges in line with public opinion, even assuming that result
4 15
were desirable.
Assuming that judicial accountability to the public is a realistic goal,
reliance on the judicial accountability argument is rooted in the false
4 16
premise that independence and accountability are incompatible.
Taking the simplest definition of accountability to be "answerability or
responsibility," to define judicial accountability one must determine to
whom judges answer. 4 17 As discussed, proponents of judicial elections
argue that judges should be accountable to the public4 18 while
410. Weiser, supra note 4, at 665-67.
411. See Cook County Study, supra note 335 (asserting that party slating is considered the
dominant factor in the outcome of judicial elections in Cook County).
412. See supra Part III.B (presenting survey data about Illinois voters).
413. Id. One recent local illustration of the importance of an ethnic surname involved
Chicago attorney Frederick Rhine. Steve Patterson, Failed Candidate Hopes New Name Gets
Him Elected, CHI. SUN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at 8. In 2002, Rhine ran for judge in Cook County
and was defeated by a candidate named Patrick Michael O'Brien. Id. To bolster his chances in
the 2005 election, Rhine changed his name to something more appealing-Patrick Michael
O'Brien. Id. Rhine admitted, "It seemed like a very voter-friendly name." Id. He also said, "I
had hoped not to make this terribly public.. . I don't want to become the poster boy for all that's
wrong with the system." Id. He added that the campaign tactic was the result of "the unfortunate
reality of our system." Id. According to Rhine, there are three criteria for being a Cook County
judge: "A fine Irish name, [whether you are] a slated candidate or [whether you are] the only
woman where all the other candidates are male." Id. Just this year, Gov. Blagojevich signed a
bill requiring candidates who changed their names within three years before running for judicial
office to include "formerly known as" under their name. Abdon M. Pallasch, Gov OKs Bill
Targeting Wannabe Irish Judges, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at 15.
414. See supra Part II.B (presenting survey data about Illinois voters). See supra note 407 for
a discussion of the argument that appointive or merit selection systems have the same flaw.
415. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (the "will of the people" does not prevail
in most judicial elections).
416. White, supra note 15, at 1059.
417. Id. at 1060.
418. See supra Part II.A.2 (presenting arguments in favor of judicial accountability over
judicial independence).
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opponents frequently argue that judges are accountable only to the "rule
One scholar discusses these two viewpoints and
of law." 4 19
persuasively argues that judicial accountability to the voting public
420
conflicts with the purpose of our tripartite system of government.
Asking judges to be accountable to the voting public as constituents
begs the question, "What constituents? '4 2 1 How do we identify those
groups and what does accountability to them require? 4 22 Ought judges
decide cases with the interests of their constituents in mind? 4 23 If so,
the risks to the due process rights of individual litigants are

substantial .424
B. Movement Toward Intermediate Remedies
Efforts to reform judicial selection methods by eliminating elections
have not proven politically attainable. 42 5 Despite active efforts of
judicial selection reformers, thirty-one states still elect some or all of

their judiciaries in contested elections. 426 Recognizing the flaws in this
process, Illinois and other states with elected judiciaries are searching
for intermediate proposals for reforming the election process that
achieve that delicate balance between political reality and judicial

integrity. 427
1. Public Financing
One proposal for mitigating the effects of campaign contributions is
public financing for judicial campaigns. 4 28

Advocates of public

financing assert that it will reduce the potential for special interest
groups to influence judicial behavior and address the public perception
429
that such influence occurs.

419. White, supra note 15, at 1060.
420. Id. at 1061.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See supra notes 114-20 (discussing the way pressures on judges to conform to the
majority will threaten the constitutional rights of individuals).
425. Carrington, supra note 58, at 114 (noting that elimination of judicial elections in favor of
appointment systems is "not saleable in most states").
426. BERKSON, supra note 72, at 6.
427. CALL TO ACTION, supra note 322, at 12.
428. See id. at 60 (proposing public financing for at least some judicial elections); GOLDBERG,
supra note 387, at 37-39 (same). See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the
Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819 (2002) (considering whether public
funding for judicial candidates can be made conditional on the candidate's adherence to an
otherwise unconstitutional campaign speech code).
429. Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY.
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In 2002, North Carolina became the first state to adopt a publicly
4 30
funded campaign financing system for all levels of the judiciary.
Candidates with demonstrated public support who agree to accept strict
fundraising and spending limits have access to the Public Campaign
Financing Fund. 4 3 1 The program is funded in part by revenue from an
optional three-dollar tax return check-off, and a fifty-dollar increase in
attorney membership fees. 43 2 Eligible candidates 4 33 receive lump sum
payments to their campaigns 4 34 and are prohibited from engaging in any
further private fund raising. 4 35 If a candidate is outspent by a privately
financed candidate or by third-party expenditures, "rescue" matching
funds are available. 43 6 In the 2004 North Carolina election cycle,
fourteen out of sixteen eligible judicial candidates applied to the
4 37
program; twelve candidates qualified and received funds.
Wisconsin's experience with voluntary public financing for its
Supreme Court races illustrates one potential problem with such a
system. 438 Wisconsin supplemented private fund raising in judicial
elections for its Supreme Court with a partial public financing system
beginning in the 1970s. 439 However, the system was inadequately
funded. 440 Wisconsin funded the program with revenues generated by a
one-dollar tax return check-off, but taxpayer participation declined
sharply in the late 1990s. 4 4 1 As the size of the grants diminished, fewer
candidates opted to participate. 442

L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1471 (2001).
430. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163-278.61 - 163-278.70 (West 2006).
431. Id. § 163-278.61.
432. Id. § 163-278.63. Other sources of revenue for the fund include previously unspent
revenues, civil penalties assessed for violations of the campaign financing statute, and voluntary
donations from business entities or other associations. Id. § 163-278.63.
433. Candidates become eligible for funding by limiting private fundraising in the year prior
to the race to less than $10,000, filing a declaration of intent, and collecting limited contributions
from 350 registered voters. Id. § 163-278.64.
434. Id. § 163-278.65(b).
435. Id. § 163-278.64(d)(3).
436. Id. § 163-278.67(a) and (b). "Rescue Funds" are available when "funds in opposition to
a certified candidate or in support of an opponent to that candidate" exceed the "trigger" amount,
determined by statute. Id. Rescue matching will provide up to two times the maximum qualifying
contributions for the judicial office sought. Id.
437. GOLDBERG, supra note 387, at 39.
438. See Geyh, supra note 429, at 1476-78 (describing the Wisconsin experience).
439. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.001 et seq. (West 2004).
440. Geyh, supra note 429, at 1477.
441. Id. at 1476.
442. Id.
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In Illinois, legislation proposed early in 2006 would create a public
financing system similar to North Carolina's. 44 3 It would establish
voluntary public financing for eligible candidates 44 4 to the Supreme
Court and Appellate Court. 4 4 5
Revenue for the fund would be
generated by individual taxpayer check-offs, contributions from
446
attorneys, civil penalties, unspent revenues, and voluntary donations.
Like the North Carolina system, the program would provide "rescue
funds" if a candidate is outspent by a certain amount. 44 7 Participants
must agree to abide by strict limits on fund raising and campaign
expenditures. 448
Public financing in Illinois would not likely resolve the issues that
contribute to public cynicism about the courts. 4 4 9 First, candidates must
be persuaded that adequate funds will be available to support a
candidate opposed by a privately funded candidate. 450 Second, there is
little reason to think that the program would greatly alter the
significance of party slating as a determining factor in Illinois' partisan
judicial elections. 45 1 Moreover, in many elections, slated candidates
have an advantage that can only be overcome by substantial campaign
funds; imposing spending limits or other campaign finance reforms
might eliminate this leveling agent and further increase the power of
4 52
slating.
2. Amending Ethical Rules
Another proposed antidote to politicized judicial campaigns and
broad speech restrictions is amending judicial ethics rules. 4 53 The Final
Draft Report's proposed revisions to the Model Code aim at this
purpose. 45 4 As noted above, the proposed revisions are similar to the
443. H.B. 4610, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2006).
444. Similar to the North Carolina system, candidates become eligible by filing an application
and collecting a limited number of qualifying contributions. Id. § 9A-20.
445. Id. § 9A-5.
446. Id. § 9A-15(b).
447. Id. § 9A-35.
448. Id. § 9A-5.
449. See Geyh, supra note 429, at 1478-80 (discussing potential problems with publicly
funded judicial elections).
450. See id. (discussing the difficulties in finding an adequate source of funding for

Wisconsin's program).
451. Cook County Study, supra note 335, at 43.
452. Id.
453. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Final Draft Report 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.htmi.
454. The Commission was motivated in part "by issues that continue to arise as a result of the
variety of methods utilized in the judicial selection process." Id.
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current Illinois Code; the revisions eliminate the "announce clause,"

allow judges to speak on measures to improve the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice, and prohibit "commitments" to rule a
particular way on an issue likely to come before the court. 455 Therefore,
the criticisms leveled at the speech provisions of the Illinois Code apply
to the Model Code's revisions. 456 Ethics rules drafted to accommodate
both the First Amendment and the state's interest in judicial impartiality
and independence cannot resolve the tension between inefficacy and
457
unconstitutionality.

3. Reliance on Disqualification Requirements
Finally, some commentators suggest that disqualification rules are an
alternative to speech restrictions to serve the state's interest in judicial
impartiality. 45 8 The decisions in Bader and Feldman reflect the view of
judicial election proponents that recusal standards may guarantee that
every litigant appear before an impartial judge. 4 59 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in White suggested more stringent
recusal standards as an alternative means of safeguarding the
appearance of judicial propriety. 460 Ideally, where the state cannot
pursue its interest in judicial integrity by the abridgement of speech,
disqualification rules could prevent a judge from sitting in cases where
his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.4 6 1
455. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5 (Final Draft Report 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html.
456. See supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that the Illinois Code cannot effectively safeguard the
integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary).
457. Id.; cf De Muniz, supra note 3, at 764 (forecasting the demise of speech restrictions). See
also Minzner, supra note 19, at 210 (arguing that speech restrictions notwithstanding, there are a
wide variety of methods available to send signals to voters about how a judicial candidate would
rule upon reaching the bench).
458. See Carrington, supra note 58, at 115 (suggesting disqualification where a large
contributor to a judge's campaign is a party or has a significant economic stake in the action
before the court as one means of mitigating the corrupting effects of politicized judicial
elections). See also Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 706-10
(E.D. Ky. 2004) (upholding Kentucky recusal statutes as narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests).
459. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043-44 (D.N.D. 2005);
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (D.
Alaska 2005) (finding that state recusal statutes are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
state interest in judicial impartiality).
460. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Minnesota may choose to have an elected judiciary. It may strive to define those characteristics
that exemplify judicial excellence. It may enshrine its definitions in a code of judicial conduct. It
may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires.").
461. Id.; Carrington, supra note 58, at 115. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) et. seq. (setting forth the
federal standards for disqualification, that state, "[any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
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Reliance on disqualification standards as a means of ensuring judicial
impartiality in every case, however, is impractical.4 6 2 To begin with,
difficulties will surely arise in the drafting of a statute adequate to fulfill

this function.

463

Defining the activities that implicate recusal and the

relationship between those activities and the parties or lawyers before
the court are only two potential drafting problems. 4 64 Furthermore,

implementing comprehensive disqualification rules would likely result
in administrative problems and substantial costs to the parties interested
in bringing motions for recusal.465
For other reasons, stringent disqualification standards will not
eliminate numerous instances of real or perceived judicial bias. 46 6 First,

the right to recusal becomes theoretical if the public views judicial bias
as an institutional problem because parties will consider the remedy
futile and forego it entirely. 4 67 Additionally, motions for recusal are not

a transparent method of challenging judicial bias because recusal
46 8

actions by nature are non-public and rarely attract media attention.
46 9
The relationship of third parties to the court is also problematic.
On the one hand, the right to move for recusal is unavailable to third

parties such as interest groups, thereby cutting off those with resources
to take action against judicial bias. 4 70 On the other hand, insofar as
disqualification rules limit the influence of substantial contributors on
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.").
462. See Voting and Democracy: Judicial Elections and Free Speech, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1141-42 (2006) (arguing that recusal as a remedy for judicial bias "suffers from a deep
manageability problem").
463. Thomas R. Phillips, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 131-32 (1998).
464. Id. Phillips describes his own experience with the Supreme Court of Texas'
consideration of a rule prohibiting judges from sitting where parties or lawyers before the court
were substantial contributors, noting some of the difficult questions that arose: the degree of
lawyer involvement required before recusal is necessary, the treatment of business entities,
defining a "case" before the court that would fall under the ban, and whether the rule should
apply to challengers. Id.
465. Carrington, supra note 58, at 115. Professor Carrington considers disqualification rules a
"saleable response" to the problem of influential campaign donors and only notes in passing the
problem of administrative difficulties and costs to parties. Id.
466. See Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct's Prohibitionof ExtrajudicialSpeech Creatingthe Appearance of Bias,
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 445 (2006) (arguing that "neither of the proposed alternatives to
[the appearance of bias] standard-recusal or resort to the ballot box-adequately protects
litigants' due process rights.").
467. Id. at 479.
468. Id. at 481.
469. Id. at 479.
470. Id.
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judges' impartiality, such rules would not easily reach third-party
interest groups in the campaign context; the parties who intend to

influence judicial selection by spending money could still spend
anonymously. 47 1 In sum, either the recusal mechanism is unsatisfactory

because it cuts off third parties with resources from confronting judicial
bias, or it is unsatisfactory because it does not prevent third parties from

creating judicial bias or its appearance by spending money.
Assuming

these

problems

could

be

surmounted,

the

very

effectiveness of recusal motions to disqualify partial judges proves a
flaw in the mechanism. 4 72 Presuming that current recusal standards are
adequate to disqualify judges in appropriate circumstances, every judge
who does invoke her First Amendment and campaign solicitation rights
will inevitably be disqualified. 47 3 The result would be a transparent,
democratically elected judiciary that cannot serve on a myriad of cases
because of free speech they engaged in and campaign funding they
acquired. 474 A less extreme result would jeopardize the due process
rights of future litigants by failing to guarantee them an impartial
judge. 47 5 Recusal does not protect the "appearance of impartiality" if
judges are constantly required to disqualify themselves because of wellknown biases and campaign funding practices. 47 6
Stricter
disqualification rules may also work at cross purposes with broader
First Amendment freedoms; routine disqualifications for campaign
speech or conduct that do not necessarily threaten due process could
have a silencing effect on candidate speech.47 7
Because merit selection has not proven politically attainable in many
states, judicial selection reformers seem resigned to pursuing other
reforms of the judicial election process. 47 8 Although reforming the
471. Carrington, supra note 58, at 115; Champagne & Cheek, supra note 126, at 921 (noting
the argument that judges are becoming "captives" of influential interest groups).
472. See Selzer, supra note 391, at 233 (noting that "replacement judges may be hard to find"
where discussing controversial political and social issues requires disqualification).
473. See id. (noting that "replacement judges may be hard to find," where judges are required
to disqualify themselves); Kevin McDermott, Recusals By Judges Could Clog the System, ST.
LouIs POST DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 2006, at B1 (suggesting that "a closer look at judicial campaign
finance records suggests that such a standard could virtually paralyze Illinois' court system").
474. See Sparling, supra note 466, at 480 (noting that "recusal would be futile if all other
judges on the bench were similarly prejudiced.").
475. Cf Croley, supra note 114, at 726 (arguing that threats to a judge's decisional
independence place the constitutional rights of individuals and minorities in jeopardy).
476. Cf.Selzer, supra note 391, at 233 (discussing the potential problems with relying on
recusal as a mechanism to ensure judicial impartiality).
477. Voting and Democracy, supra note 462, at 1142.
478. See, e.g., CALL TO ACTION, supra note 322, at 7 (stating that "[miany observers have
concluded that moving to a wholly appointed judiciary is the best answer to [problems facing

890
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judicial election process is a commendable goal, marginal reforms such
as those described in this article do not really address the most apparent
problems with judicial elections. 4 79 Those who are serious about

reform should not settle for less than a comprehensive
judicial selection
80
solution.

4

V.

PROPOSAL

In light of the inadequacy of the reforms discussed above, this Part
contends that judicial elections as they exist are the least preferable
means to select the judiciary. 4 8 1 Without espousing any particular
method as a perfect solution, this Part discusses merit selection as an
4 82
alternative to judicial elections.

elected judiciaries], [b]ut movement away from systems providing for contested elections of
judges has not occurred in most states [and] too little attention has been given to incremental
changes in the judicial election process to address some of the most serious threats to judicial
independence and impartiality, and to appreciably enhance public trust in the courts.") The
American Bar Association, which traditionally has strongly supported merit selection, recently
began advocating for various reforms of judicial elections as an alternative. See AM. BAR ASS'N,
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY JUDICIARY v-vi (2003) (stating that "the preferred system of state court judicial

selection is a commission-based appointive system" but offering a list of "alternative
recommendations").
479. See Zeidman, supra note 124, at 718-19 (arguing that although there is a "sense" that
merit selection is not politically attainable, reformers should focus efforts on devising the best
system possible, i.e., merit selection, rather than accept lesser reforms).
480. Id.
481. See infra Part V.A (discussing why Illinois should eliminate judicial elections).
482. See infra Part V.B (discussing a possible method of reform). This Comment does not
propose to solve the dilemma facing the Illinois judiciary today because discussing the proposed
solutions to these issues would span an equal amount of pages. The purpose of this Comment is
to challenge complacency and resignation about Illinois' current system and to argue that,
although undoubtedly other judicial selection methods have flaws, Illinois judicial elections are
fast becoming the least preferable method of judicial selection. For further reading on merit
selection as a judicial selection reform proposal, see Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current
Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1994) (offering a comprehensive review
of the history of merit selection, its current status in the United States, and a description of the
structural features of the wide range of existing merit plans); Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on
Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2005) (highlighting some aspects of dissatisfaction
with judicial selection, and suggesting some remedies, including proposed elements of a merit
selection system); Zeidman, supra note 124, at 718-20 (arguing that if properly instituted, merit
selection is better than judicial elections); Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case
Study of Judicial Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 791 (2004)
(reporting the results of a study comparing elected and merit selected judges; finding that merit
selection does more to reduce judicial misconduct, promote diversity and independence; and
describing the components of a "model merit selection process").
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A. The Case for JudicialSelection Reform

Since early in the last century, lawyers and scholars perceived the
need to reform the Illinois method of judicial selection. 48 3 The reasons

this movement began still exist: escalating campaign costs, the
appearance that candidates are beholden to their campaign contributors,
the dominance of party leaders in choosing candidates, the fear that
judges make decisions with regard to special interests rather than the
law, apathy and lack of information on the part of voters, and public
484
cynicism about the courts as a consequence of these factors.

Modem-day First Amendment jurisprudence, which prevents the State
from enforcing meaningful restrictions on speech and campaign
conduct, will likely exacerbate these problems. 4 85 In the current
campaign climate, the Illinois Code is an ineffective means of
4 86 If
safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
the state's power to regulate judicial speech and activity is limited to
vaguely drafted restrictions, the state is effectively powerless to prevent

the judiciary

from being

transformed

into something

like

a

representative branch, where judges announce their policy preferences
48 7
to gain votes.
Such a transformation would be undesirable because, in our
4 88
constitutional framework, judges do not "represent" constituents;
4 89
they make decisions by applying law to the facts of a specific case.
The Final Draft Report accurately states, "Citizens have a due process
right to judges who will make decisions based on the evidence, the law,

483. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the history of judicial selection in Illinois). See also
Albert M. Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges in a Metropolitan District, 52
ANNALS 1, 12 (1914) (describing many of the problems associated with the election system and
first proposing a form of merit selection) [hereinafter Kales I];Albert M. Kales, Methods of
Selecting and Retiring Judges, I1 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 133, 134-35 (1928) (urging the
adoption of a better method of selection and retirement of judges).
484. See supra Part IIH.B (examining all these factors through voter surveys and media
coverage of the Illinois judiciary).
485. See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COL. L. REv. 563, 617 (2004) (arguing that more
substantive judicial campaigning is inevitable after White).
486. Cf Seizer, supra note 391, at 203-204, 225 (noting these factors and noting that scholars
are "tak[ing] a second look" at judicial elections).
487. Cf Johnson, supra note 10, at 1027-28 (arguing that absent the ethical norms prohibiting
ex parte communications, limiting political activities, requiring judges to avoid certain
relationships, and mandating recusal in certain circumstances, an independent judiciary cannot
exist).
488. See White, supra notes 416-23 and accompanying text (discussing why accountability to
the voting public is not a desirable goal in our constitutional system).
489. Id.
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and the arguments of the parties, regardless of the personal views of the
judge." 4 90 Citizens also have a due process right to judges who make
decisions without regard to the views of constituents-whether they are
the voters or the political party leaders that control the ballot.49 1 More
importantly, the existence and integrity of the judiciary depends
on
49 2
constituency.
any
of
independent
are
judges
that
belief
citizens'
B. Reforming the JudicialSelection Process
The purpose of this Comment is to highlight the need for institutional
reform of the Illinois judicial selection process. Illinois legislators,
lawyers, and voters must debate the merits of the election process and
alternative selection methods. This is an ongoing debate in scholarly
literature. 4 93 However, in order to effect change, the discussion needs
to enter into political debate.
Although perhaps not a comprehensive solution, merit selection is
one alternative to judicial election that has proven successful in other
states. 4 94 Most merit plans provide for a nominating commission
composed of lawyers and non-lawyers, appointed by a panel of state
officials, attorneys, and citizens. 4 95 The commission nominates a short
list from the group of candidates for each judicial vacancy, from which
group the appointing authority, usually the governor, selects. 496 Then,
the appointed candidate, after serving an initial term, must usually go
49 7
before the voters in an uncontested retention election.
490. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 5, cmt.
15 (Final Draft Report 2005),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html.
491. Croley, supra note 114, at 708.
492. See White, supra note 15, at 1060-61 (explaining why judges cannot be accountable to
"constituents").
493. See supra Part I.A.2-3 (discussing the arguments in favor of and opposing judicial

elections).
494. A form of merit selection was first proposed in 1914 by Albert Kales of the American
Judicature Society. Kales I, supra note 483, at 12. Kales suggested a method whereby a "judicial
council" composed of a chief justice and presiding judges of the divisions of the court would
create a list of eligible candidates, from which the chief justice would make selections. Id.
Currently, about two-thirds of the states and the District of Columbia use merit selection to select
some or all of their judges. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT
STATUS (2003), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf. [hereinafter CURRENT
STATUS].
495. The panel may include the governor of the state, the attorney general, judges of the
highest courts, members of the bar association, state legislators, and private citizens. See Am.
JUDICATURE Soc'Y (2006), MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE BEST JUDGES
(2006), http://www.ajs.orgljs/ms-descrip.pdf.
496. Id.
497. Id. In other states, judges are evaluated by a retention commission. Id. In New York, by
contrast, there is no retention election. Daniel Becker & Mahia Reddick, Judicial Selection
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Although many commentators argue that the merit system does not
take politics out of judicial selection, at the very least the merit system
may spare judges from involvement in contentious elections, thereby
setting them apart from the political process. 4 9 8 If the State wants to
ensure the appearance of impartiality and independence of the judiciary,
merit selection could be one way to achieve that goal. 499 However,
there are a myriad of different ways to implement such a system. 50 0 For
example, instituting an alternative system for selecting members of the
Supreme Court, rather than the entire judicial selection system, is an
50 1
intermediate option.
VI. CONCLUSION

The First Amendment grants judges their freedom of speech as
citizens, whether they are running for elective office or not. It does not
require the state to stand aside while the reality and perception of
judicial independence is battered in expensive, hotly contested
elections, over which voters exercise little control. Without regulating
inappropriate political and personal pressures on judges and candidates
that are sure to flow from the exercise of First Amendment freedoms in
political judicial campaigns, the state cannot prevent harm to the
public's perception of the courts. To fully comply with the demands of
the First Amendment, Illinois must choose between increasingly issueoriented, expensive campaigns and an alternative form of judicial
selection.
Certainly, it is undeniable that no judge's mind is a tabula rasa with
respect to constitutional, legal, or political issues, that empirical studies
demonstrate the ways policy considerations and personal bias influence
judges' decisions, and that attempting to mask these facts does not serve
the interests of due process, fairness, or justice. However, to accept
these imperfections in the judiciary as "reality" and tolerate a system
that intensifies their effects is to condone behavior, mental attitudes, and
Reform: Examples from Six States, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 19 (2003), available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/jsreform.pdf. Instead, judges reapply to the commission at the end of their
terms and must be considered along with the other applicants. Id.
498. See id. at 25 (arguing that in New York, the merit system has at least achieved the
appearance of a judiciary that stands apart from the rest of the political system).
499. See supra Part V.B (proposing merit selection as one possible alternative to judicial
elections).
500. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 494 (setting forth the various characteristics of merit
selection systems in different states).
501. For example, twenty-four states use merit selection, four states use gubernatorial
appointment, and two states use legislative appointment to initially select judges to courts of last
resort. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, supra note 79, at 6.
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issue-oriented results that should be discouraged. Rather, the state
should seek to encourage judicial evenhandedness and try to insulate
judges from the influences of money and political pressure in pursuit of
the reality and appearance of judicial impartiality.
Instead, the current nature of judicial elections obliges the state to
accept the pressure of these factors on a branch that is supposed to be
independent from inappropriate influences and impartial. The fact that
such elements are a reality is no reason to applaud their effects as
necessary to ensure judicial accountability to a public that rarely votes
in judicial elections, and whose impression of the fairness and justice of
the courts is diminishing. While recognizing that human imperfections
will always threaten the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the
judiciary, Illinois should adopt a judicial selection system better-suited
to encourage judges to strive for impartiality in every case. The
inadequacy of less drastic reforms supports the conclusion that Illinois
should renew its efforts to eliminate judicial elections in favor of an
alternative method of judicial selection. To date, the best suggestion
has been the adoption of some form of merit selection.

